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Those who won our independence by revolution were not 
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did 
not exalt order at the cost of liberty. 
NUMBER 2 
-BRANDEIS, J.t 
T HERE ARE MANY FANCIFUL WAYS of suggesting the accomplish-ment of the impossible, as making bricks without straw, or put-ting on Hamlet without the melancholy Dane, or making an 
omelet without any eggs. 
The trouble with those phrases is their familiarity; they have become 
cliches. And so anyo,ne interested in the expansion of the English language 
may note with pleasure that at the October 1950 term of the Supreme 
Court, that body gave us another handy phrase to add to this growing 
lexicon. It had a Civil Liberties term of Court-without any Liberty. 
Hyperbole? Perhaps there was one egg in that omelet, a little straw for 
the bricks. The Prince may at least have been the off-stage noises in the 
legendary performance. So with Liberty at mid-Century: she was only an 
off-stage rumble, not a character dominating the scene. 
In rgso-sr, civil rights cases were by far the most important on the 
* This article is the fifth in an annual series. While the general structure of the article has 
been the same throughout the five year period, experience has led to some modifications of its 
purposes, and these may now be said to be three: (a) to present a concise summary of the most 
interesting of the cases; (b) to comment briefly on their apparent general social significance; 
and (c) to make some record of factors observed concerning the institutional function of the 
Court. Shot through each purpose is that sense of personal relief which an author gets from 
expressing his own views as to the proper decision of the cases. The preceding articles are, 
1946 Term, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. I (I947); I947 Term, I6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. I (I948); I948 
Term, 17 Univ. Chi.L. Rev. I (I949); 1949 Term, 18 Univ. Chi.L. Rev. I (I950). They will be 
cited by the date of the Term, as I946 Term article. 
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University. 
t Whitney v. Callfomia, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
r6s 
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docket. Quantitatively it was a small term, with only 88 cases decided by 
opinion, fewer than in any year for a century! But if the measure be 
significance of the cases decided, it was a substantial term, with more 
broadly meaningful decisions than in many years. 
I. HIGH SPOTS OF THE Y,EAR 
The civil rights cases were most, but not all, of the major business of 
the term. Within ten days of the decision in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert 
Distillers Corp., invalidating provisions in state "fair trade" acts binding 
non-signing dealers to the terms of price-fixing contracts between pro-
ducers and other distributors, so-called "fair trade" prices began to col-
lapse;" where the Supreme Court had pointed toward lower prices, Macy's 
and Gimbel's quickly went. "Color TV" should be a reality before the end 
of the next term of Court under a decision upholding a Federal Communi-
cations Commission order, a matter of more general interest than legal 
signi:ficance.3 The practice of seizing industrial plants in emergencies will 
be materially affected by the first contemporary decision concerning the 
cost of such seizures to the government.4 
The civil rights cases were: The Blau cases, 5 precluding questions of 
Communist affiliation before grand juries on the ground of self-incrimina-
tion (although by the slightest misstep, the witness may waive this right) ;6 
Feiner v. New York, 7 the :first holding in Supreme Court history ever to 
permit the punishing of a public speaker for the astonishing reason that 
one member of the audience was annoyed into threats of violence by what 
the speaker said; and Collins v. Hardyman8 which so narrowly construed 
one section of the Civil Rights Act of r87I as to eliminate it. These were 
but the curtain raisers for three outstanding holdings: Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath,9 holding that the Attorney General must 
make at least some tiny revelation of why he puts organizations on his 
subversive list; the Bailey v. Richardson10 and Garner v. Board of Public 
Works of Los A ngeles'1 cases respectively, upheld the national loyalty pro-
x The method of counting cases is described in part V infra. 
2 341 U.S. 384 (1951). 
3 Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951). (As of October 1951, it 
was apparent that war shortages would delay this development.) 
4 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. II4 (1951). 
s Blau (Patricia) v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (195o); Blau (Irving) v. United States, 
340 u.s. 332 (1951). 
6 But cf. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). 
7 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
8 341 u.s. 651 (1951). 
9 34I U.S. 123 (1951). 
IO 341 U.S. 918 (1951). 
II 341 u.s. 7I6 (1951). 
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gram, and a loyalty oath in Los Angeles; and Dennis v. United Statesr the 
most important "free speech" decision since Holmes and Brandeis began 
their apparently fruitless task of finding meaning in the First Amendment. 
II. REGULATION OF LABOR AND BUSINESS 
LABOR 
By 1951, the Taft-Hartley Actx3 had been in operation long enough to 
have carried a full load of problems to the Supreme Court, and almost 
every important labor case of the year arose from that Act. To this there 
was one exception, for the most important labor case of the year seemed, 
at a glance, neither important nor a labor case; but the consequences of 
United States v. Pewee Coal Co.X4 may well outweigh any of the other deci-
sions of the year. 
In the Pewee case, the Court for the first time since the post-World War 
I era took a serious look at some of the economic consequences of plant 
seizures by the government in periods of emergency. The device of govern-
ment intervention in labor disputes by "seizure" became familiar to the 
point of routine in World War rr,xs and almost every case has consisted of 
a completely nominal government "taking" followed by establishment of 
government-set labor conditions.16 Actual management has usually re-
mained exactly where it was before. While in rare instances the "seizure" 
has been for some purpose other than that of achieving satisfactory labor 
relations,X7 the seizure sanction has· been primarily a device for govern-
ment settlement of labor disputes. 
When the government "seizes" (and the quotes will be abandoned here-
12 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
13 Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 (Supp., 
1950). -
14 341 U.S. II4 (1951). 
15 The general problem of the source and nature of the Government's power to take private 
property in wartime and the extent of its liability for such takings is discussed in: Expropria-
tion of Property for National Defense, Lands Div., Dep't Justice (1940), particularly pp. 84-
94; Marcus, The Taking and Destruction of Property Under a Defense and War Program, 
27 Com. L.Q. 317 (1942); American Economic Mobilization, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 506 (1942); 
Executive Commandeering of Strike-Bound Plants, 51 Yale L.J. 282, 289""90 (1941). 
•6 I was extensively involved in plant seizure cases during World War II. In the second 
Montgomery Ward seizure, the taking by the War Department was a real military operation, 
involving an actual possession run with stop-watch precision. But in another taking of the 
same period, only one government employee ever came within a hundred miles of the seized 
property. 
1 7 See, e.g., the episode involved in Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748 (Ct. CI., 
1950) cert. denied 339 U.S. 956 (1950), a seizure for excess profit-taking. 
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after) a plant, it is exercising the eminent domain power'8 and is subject 
to Fifth Amendment requirements that it make just compensation.'9 
Hence one of the most troublesome problems of seizure is, How shall the 
government be charged for what it has taken? What is just compensation 
for the temporary taking of a plant, the alteration of some detail of its 
labor relations, and the eventual return of it? 
Two general observations suggest the underlying problems: 
I. A decision as to the means of calculating just compensation may 
enormously affect labor relations: if the compensation is high enough to 
be attractive to the employer, he will be in no hurry to comply with gov-
ernment "suggestions" as to his labor policy, and the government may 
pay heavily for the privilege of settling the labor dispute. If the compensa-
tion is unattractive to the employer, the government will have a tre-
mendously strong hand with which to compel his acquiescence in its pro-
posals. 
2. One possible method of calculating just compensation would be 
simple quitclaim. The taking would be recognized as nominal, and the 
government would "release" the property on condition that the owner 
release the government from all claims. Profits and losses for the period of 
seizure would be the owner's since, exceptfor the change in his labor policy, 
usually on a point fairly minor in the whole profit and loss structure, he 
was unaffected by the seizure. This quitclaim device is obviously not the 
only way out of the :financial situation created by seizure, but it is the only 
one which gives the owner neither a premium nor a penalty for having 
been seized. It is the device which, by informal negotiation rather than by 
court decision, has actually been used for the past ten years. 
The Pewee case swept the quitclaim system into discard. 
There was a considerable range of possible solutions which the Court 
might have chosen. It might conceivably, though either of these possi-
bilities is unlikely, have held that the taking for this purpose is non-com-
pensable;•o or it might have held it not a "taking" at all, but a form of 
•8 The government has argued that the President possesses this power as an aspect of the 
war power even without authorizing legislation: "There is an executive power to take property 
in time of emergency. [This is] a power in the nature of eminent domain." Brief for the United 
States at 33, United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., ISO F. 2d 369 (C.A. 7th, I945). 
'9 Applications of the compensation requirement as to war-time takings in other areas are 
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 48I (I93I); Int'l Paper Co. v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 399 (I93I); and see dicta in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 8I, 
88 (r92I), as developed in United States v. McFarland, IS F. 2d 823, 826 (C.A. 4th, 1926). 
2° Cf. United States v. Pacific R.R., I20 U.S. 227 (I887 ), holding the government not liable 
for destruction of bridges in actual combat, and quoting a veto message of President Grant as 
to the non-compensability of property "temporarily occupied, or evim actually destroyed" in 
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"regulation."21 It might have held that the seizure is a taking, but that the 
control is so nominal as to put no liability on the government."2 Or it 
might have required "just and fair" compensation, but calculated it as the 
actual operating return.2 3 It did none of these things. 
The Pewee Coal Co. was one of the concerns whose property was taken 
and operated by the government in the course of the 1943 coal strike. The 
lower court found a $2,241 operating loss attributable to the government's 
operation, and gave judgment for that amount to Pewee.2 4 All nine Jus-
tices agreed that this was a "taking" for Fifth Amendment purposes, but 
they split widely on compensation. Justice Black, for three other Justices, 
enunciated the following land-mark propositions in the course of affirming 
the judgment: 
Like any private person or corporation, the Uttited States ttormally is entitled to the 
profits from, and must bear the losses of, business operations which it conducts .... 
Where losses resulting from operation of property taken must be borne by the Govern-
ment, it makes no difference that the losses are caused in whole or in part by compliance 
with administrative regulations requiring additional wages to be paid .... What-
ever might have been Pewee's losses had it been left free to exercise its own business 
judgment, the crucial fact is that the Government chose to intervene by taking 
possession and operating control. By doing so, it became the proprietor and, in the ab-
sence of contrary arrangements, was entitled to the bmteftts and subject to the losses 
which that status involves.os 
Justice Reed, concurring, argued that the government should be liable 
only for such losses, in these war-time labor takings, as would result from 
major emergencies. In similar vein, see In the Matter of a Petition of Right, [I915]3 K.B. 649, 
but for modification of this view and acceptance of the principle of compensation, see Att'y 
Gen. v. DeKeyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A. C. 508. 
21 Cf. Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 188 (1922) and Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393 (1923). Regulation of the labor conditions which is an object of 
the taking might have been analogized to rent control, Block v. Hirch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 
(1921). 
22 This is the soundest of the alternatives listed, and is based on direct holdings in Marion & 
Rye Valley Ry. Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 28o (1926); Nevada-California-Oregon Ry. v. 
United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 75 (1928). Those cases held that nominal control was non-compensa-
ble, and might have been brought to bear here, as Justice Burton argued in dissent. 
2J A possible analogy is United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939), in which the 
Court held that a person flooded in a government contrived spillway area resulting from its 
Mississippi levee program could claim no compensation; for if there had been no levees, he 
would have been flooded anyway. So here: if there had been no taking, the strike losses would 
usually far outrun the operating losses. 
2 4 This sum represents the expenditure made in compliance with a War Labor Board di-
rective. Pewee also originally sued for operating losses of $36,128 which were not the product 
of government action. This was denied it, and Pewee did not cross appeal. 
2S United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. u7, uS (1951) (emphasis added). 
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the government's own act, in this case the enforcement of a War Labor 
Board order; but that it should not be saddled with the operating losses of 
businesses which were independently operating at long-term losses, such as 
"certain railroads, coal mines, or television broadcasting stations."~6 The 
dissenters, in a brief opinion by Justice Burton, held that Pewee was not 
harmed at all by the government's acts, and in effect affirmed a faith in the 
quitclaim system. 
The vital passages of the majority opinion are those tucked in phrases 
italicized above: "The United States normally is entitled to the profits 
from" and "was entitled to the benefits" of a taking. In this case, true, the 
government takes a loss; but normally these emergency war-time takings 
occur in inflationary periods in which concerns can scarcely avoid making 
money; and while the government may occasionally take a loss, as on a 
hopeless railroad, it will usually gain considerably. For an extreme ex-
ample, if the government had seized General Motors in 1945, it would 
have had a claim on the 188 millions in profits made by that concern that 
year. Not all of that profit would have gone to the government, even under 
the majority view; for under it, the government will have to pay fair com-
pensation for its takings, and "the Government's profit and loss experi-
ence may well be one factor involved in computing reasonable compensa-
tion for a temporary taking.""7 But the government will get some of it. 
If this four-man view becomes that of a stable majority, the govern-
ment has gained enormous new power to compel settlements on its own 
terms. A prosperous business will be unable to afford the drain on its 
profits where the government is "entitled to the benefits" of a taking. The 
position of unions is correspondingly improved; for the new control over 
employers is not balanced by any new control over labor. Under the old 
system, if labor were to threaten a strike in an emergency, the employer 
could be essentially indifferent to the results of government intervention 
by seizure. Under the new system, the employer should go far to avoid 
that result. 
The Court's other major labor problems of the year turned on its be-
wildered attempts to :find its way through the ins:oherencies of the Taft-
Hartley Act. As to two of those problems, the most rational solution is 
that Congress had nothing in mind at all; but since courts are not allowed 
• 6 Ibid., at n9. 
• 27Leading temporary taking cases are United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373 (I945); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (I946); Kimball Laundry Co. v. 
United States, 338 U.S. I (I949). 
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to throw in the sponge, they were compelled to construct some path 
through the maze. 
Brave, at least, was the solution to the 8(b) (4) (A) problem.28 That sec-
tion makes it an unfair labor practice for any union to engage in concerted 
activities of which "an object" is to force "any employer or other per-
son ... to cease doing business with any other person." The one point on 
which the Court unanimously agreed was that these words did not mean 
what they said, for otherwise substantially all concerted activities would 
have been made illegal. That is to say, the object of picketing normally is 
to keep non-striking workers, or customers or suppliers or others, from 
doing business with an employer, in which case its object is to cause "an 
employer ... to cease doing business" with another person. 
The legislative history shows that this language was not meant to go 
as far as it appears to, but instead was intended to eliminate "secondary 
boycotts" only. The rub here is that the legislators appear to have been 
against secondary boycotts without having any clear idea of what they 
were.29 
The problem came to a head in the building industry, over which the 
Board took jurisdiction for the :first time after the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act.30 Normally, building is a process of contracting and sub-
contracting, and most of the work goes to the nineteen building trades 
unions of the AFL with their two million members. But occasionally a 
prime contractor may let one small part of a job to a non-union sub-
contractor, and the unions may then refuse to work further on the build-
ing. In a group of such cases, the Court, Justice Burton speaking for the 
majority, held that such strikes are secondary boycotts, and illegal under 
this section. 
More was never made to hang on less. The Court is apparently agreed 
that if two crafts, one unionized and the other not, are employed by one 
contractor, the unionized wing may legitimately strike against work with 
their non-union brethren; but if the same crafts do the identical work on 
the same job, but under different subcontractors, there may be no strike. 
28 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(A) (Supp., 1950). The cases are NLRB v. 
Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Int'l Bro. Elec. Workers 
v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); Local74 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951); and NLRB v. Int'l 
Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951). 
29 See NLRB v. Int'l Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 673, 674 (1951). 
J• The discussion following is influenced by The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the 
Building and Construction Industxy, 6o Yale L.J. 673 (1951), from which the facts of this 
paragraph are taken. 
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Justice Douglas, dissenting, would have given quite a different interpreta-
tion to the concept of secondary boycott. As he commonsensically said: 
"All the union asked was that union men not be compelled to work along-
side non-union men on the same job."31 This is so palpably different from 
the traditional objection to the secondary boycott-the objection to at-
tacks on an employer on "a front remote from the immediate dispute"3•-
that Douglas thought the Act did not reach it. 
The decision may materially alter relations in the building industry, 
and greatly weaken the unions there. "With employers numerous, em-
ployment of short duration, and individual craft units small on any one 
project, unions have traditionally been forced to rely on the cooperation of 
all workers on a job in order to bring pressure on any particular em-
ployer."33 In these cases the strike should be regarded realistically as 
against the prime contractor who brought the subcontractor onto the job, 
not against the independent subcontractor; and to dispose of the matter 
as Justice Burton does with the phrase, "[tjhe business relationship be-
tween independent contractors is too well established in the law to be 
overridden without clear language doing so"34 overlooks the fact that the 
language used by Congress is so totally inapposite that Justice Burton is 
forced entirely to judicial legislation to make any sense of the provision. 
If judicial legerdemain can turn a seeming prohibition of strikes generally 
into a limitation on "secondary boycotts" only, it ought to be able to 
accomplish the next step of giving a rational definition of "secondary 
boycott." 
The solution of the secondary boycott problem is brave at least in the 
sense that it takes firm hold of the problem and does something with it. 
The same cannot be said for the (more difficult) question of the scope of 
judicial review under the Taft-Hartley Act. The disposition of this ques-
tion can be described only as a meditative contemplation of a hard ques-
tion, followed by sweeping the whole troublesome matter out of sight. 
The Wagner Act had been read to say that Board orders were to be 
enforced by the Courts of Appeal if supported by "substa~tial evidence." 
There has been considerable uncertainty as to what this standard actually 
was, but whatever it was, Congress was dissatisfied with it because it, in 
Congressional opinion, unduly limited judicial review. After considering a 
variety of possibilities, Congress finally wrote into the Taft-Hartley Act a 
31 NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). 
32 Douds v. Metropolitan Federation, 75 F. Supp. 672, 677 (S.D. N.Y., 1948). 
33 Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act, etc., note 30 supra, at 688. 
34 NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 690 (1951). 
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provision that Board orders should be enforced "if supported by substan-
tial evidence On the record COnsidered as a whole."3S 
A Court of Appeals, puzzled as to its duties under the old language, 
might well be more puzzled under the new. Exactly what is it supposed to 
do now that it had not done before? The government contended that the 
new language made no difference, that this was simply a new way of stat-
ing the former practice. But this does injustice to the urgency with which 
Congress made the change. In an objective and thoughtful opinion, Jus-
tice Frankfurter did the best that could be done with this phrase which, 
by itself, is almost meaningless. He reproved Congress lightly for failing to 
speak "with that clarity of purpose which Congress supposedly furnishes 
courts in order to enable them to enforce its true will," but he concluded: 
"It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood .... As legisla-
tion that mood must be respected, even though it can only serve as a 
standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness 
of application."36 
And what is the new mood? The courts shall no longer, if they did so 
before, look only to whether there is some evidence to support a Board 
order in the record. Instead they should consider the whole record, and 
make some weighing of the contrary evidence before approving the order. 
Yet courts are not to hear the matter de novo; they should pay due defer-
ence to Board expertise. This, says the Court, is concededly imprecise; but 
it can not be made more definite. "To find the change so elusive that it can 
not be precisely defined does not mean that it may be ignored." In the 
last analysis, the Courts of Appeal hereafter should assure "that the 
Board keeps within reasonable grounds."37 
Surely this is a fair attempt to do the best that can be done with the 
insoluble. Congress, says the Court, wants judges to be a little stricter 
with the Labor Board. This is imprecise, perhaps necessarily so; but judges 
must nonetheless now be a little stricter. But the Court did not stop there. 
Instead, having found complete uncertainty as to the real meaning of the 
"mood," it washed its hands of the problem and declined to give any 
decision on concrete facts. 
Thus in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,38 it remanded to the Court of 
JS 61 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o(e) (Supp., 1947). The relevant cases and com-
mentators are reviewed in Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole 
Record," 64Harv. L. Rev. 1233 (1951). 
J 6 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 483, 487 (1951). 
J7 Ibid., at 490. All this is fully analyzed op. cit. supra note 35· 
38 340 U.S. 474, 497 (1951). 
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Appeals "to grant or deny enforcement as it thinks the principles ex-
pressed in this opinion dictate." In the companion case of NLRB v. Pitts-
burghS. S. Co.,39 it made this policy of withdrawal much clearer. There it 
held that the Sixth Circuit had caught the new mood, and fairly attempted 
to apply it in refusing enforcement of a Board order. It continued: "Were 
we called upon to pass on the Board's conclusions in the first instance ... 
we might well support the Board's conclusions."40 The Court thereupon 
announced that it would not grant certiorari in Labor Board cases merely 
because "on a conscientious consideration of the entire record, a Court of 
Appeals under the new dispensation finds the Board's order unsubstanti-
ated."4' 
What this means as a practical matter is that at the very point when 
some certainty might be introduced into the new language by Supreme 
Court interpretation in a few different fact situations, the Court will not 
give that certainty. This in turn means that the so-called anti-labor cir-
cuits, notably the Fifth and to a lesser extent the Sixth, are to be under no 
effective supervision. Only last year, the Court most pointedly rebuked 
the Fifth Circuit for :flagrantly substituting its views of the facts for those 
of the Labor Board.42 Justice Frankfurter then dissented. As the discern-
ing Professor Jaffe points out, though making a different point: "His view 
in that respect [i.e. in respect to last year's cases] appears now to have 
prevailed.''43 
Last of the major labor cases is the group invalidating the Wisconsin 
Public Utility Strike Law on the ground that it conflicts with the Taft-
Hartley Act. 44 The Wisconsin Act regulates public utility strikes in detail. 
A year ago, the Court in Int'l Union, UAW v. O'Brien45 held that the 
federal labor act occupies the field of its jurisdiction as to strikes: "None 
of these sections can be read as permitting concurrent state regulation of 
peaceful strikes for higher wages."46 It follows a fortiori that the Wiscon-
sin law is invalid unless the 0' Brien case is to be reconsidered, and the 
Chief Justice for the majority so held. Justice Frankfurter's extraordinar-
39 340 U.S. 498 (1951). 
4• Ibid., at 502. 
4' Ibid., at 503. 
42 NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563 (1950); NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co., 339 
U.S. 577 (1950); both commented upon in connection with this point in 1949 Term article, 4-5 . 
• 43 Jaffe, op. cit. supra note 31, at 1249. 
44 The principal case is Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951). 
45 339 U.S. 454 (1950), discussed in 1949 Term article, s-6. 
46 339 U.S. 454, 457 (1950). 
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ily attenuated dissent argues that since Congress set up a system, under 
the Taft-Hartley Act, for handling major strike emergencies of a national 
character in industries of any sort, it is somehow "impl[ied] that states 
retain the power to protect the public interest" as to utilities. 47 To para-
phrase in response a comment by that same dissenting Justice in another 
situation: "The short answer to the suggestion [that Congressional estab-
lishment of a national policy for emergencies means that it meant the 
states to be able to deal with utility strikes] is that it is a strange way of 
saying it."48 
MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 
The Schwegma1tn case created a sensation. For a time at least it "rolled 
back" a greater volume of consumer-good prices than all the regulations 
of the Office of Price Stabilization put together; and while, as a bit of 
statutory construction, the case was, to put it sedately, novel, no very 
objective criticism can fairly be expected from any commentator whose 
principal class association is as a member of the high-price-ridden con-
suming public. For the first time in many years, an agency of government 
had done something effective for the poor purchaser, though the period of 
relief may be short. 
The issue was the interpretation of the Miller-Tydings Act, which ex-
empted from the Sherman Act "contracts or agreements prescribing mini-
mum prices for the resale"49 of goods where such agreements are lawful 
under state law. Forty-five states now have such so-called "fair trade" 
laws which permit a manufacturer to set a minimum price for the resale of 
his goods by retailers. Without the Miller-Tydings Act, and the support-
ing state legislation, such resale price maintenance agreements would be 
illegal under the Sherman Act. 
There is no argument as to whether the Miller-Tydings Act legalizes 
actual agreements between manufacturers and their distributors. But 
most of the state laws go further, and make binding on all the retailers of 
the state minimum prices set in an agreement which may have been made 
between the manufacturer and only one retailer in the state. In other 
words, the state laws permit minimum price fixing by the manufacturer 
not only as to signers of an agreement, but also as to non-signers. The issue 
47 Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383, 407 (I9SI). 
48 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947). Other labor cases were NLRB v. Gullett 
Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (I9SI) on the relation of unemployment compensation to back pay 
awards; and NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (I9SI) on non-Communist 
oaths by labor federations. 
49 so Stat. 693 (1937), zs u.s.c.A. § r (z9sz). 
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is whether such st~te laws are in conflict with the Sherman Act as to the 
non-signers. 
On the face of the Act, resale price maintenance should be unenforce-
able as against non-signers. All that is exempted from the Sherman Act in 
terms are "contracts and agreements" fixing resale prices, and by defini-
tion, the non-signers have no agreements. But the legislative history 
handicaps this happy literalism. When the Miller-Tydings Act was passed, 
forty-two states had fair trade laws obligatory as to non-signers on their 
books. These laws necessarily then only applied to trade so local that the 
Sherman Act did not reach it, but Sen. Tydings said that the object of his 
bill was "to back up those acts."so Rep. DirkseJ;l, a member of the Confer-
ence Committee, specifically referred to the treatment of non-signers un-
der state acts and said that the object of the federal legislation was to put 
"the stamp of approval upon price maintenance transactions under State 
acts." The House Committee report on an early stage of the Act specifi-
cally referred to the non-signer provisions of the state laws as part of what 
it intended to legitimate. 
Justice Douglas' majority opinion freed the Act of the incubus of this 
legislative history by emphasizing that most of the legislative history was 
on forms of the bill which did not pass, and that the form of the bill which 
did pass (as a rider on a tax bill) had slightly different wording than the 
earlier bills, an argument weakened by the fact that the language changes 
had no perceptible relation to the minimum price clauses here in issue. 
Once separated from the legislative history, the words were construed 
simply as applying only to signers.51 
The case was decided on May 21st. On May 28th, Macy's, New York 
department store, a perennial non-signer, cut prices 6% on 5,978 items, 
and the rush was on. 52 Gimbel's met the challenge, and soon prices were 
tumbling in every major department store in New York. Klein on the 
Square joined the fight with an enormous reduction in the price of Bulova 
watches. 
These effects must not be exaggerated. A report of the Committee on 
the Economic Report says: 
s• All legislative history quoted here is taken from the opinions. 
s• Particularly intriguing is the concurring opinion of Justices Jackson and Minton which 
fundamentally attacks the use of fragmentary and sometimes obscure bits of legislative history 
in statutory interpretation. 
52 N.Y. Times; p. 1, col. 3 (May 29, 1951). For weeks thereafter the price war remained 
front page news. 
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An investigation indicates that substantial price cutting on fair-traded goods 
occurred in only 8 out of the 123 cities surveyed. The principal price cutting was on 
electrical household goods, cosmetics, and drug sundries. By the end of July the price 
war had almost abated. 
There seems to be little likelihood in the immediate future that the court decision 
will result in widespread price decreases. Many retailers seem to have taken ad-
vantage of the fair trade decisions to stimulate sales and reduce temporarily embarrass-
ing inventories ..•. This decision may later create problems for many retailers and 
manufacturers should inventories again become excessive and consumer demand sharp-
ly decline.s3 
But this is only to say that the decision is no substitute for an inflation 
control program. It may still be of considerable consequence, as the De-
partment of Justice has indicated an intent to prosecute manufacturers 
who refuse to sell to non-signers. 
The principal other trade regulation statutory interpretation case, in 
which the Court analyzed legislative history with an enthusiasm for its 
details which belied the disbelief some of them were to express in that 
source in the Schwegmann case, is Standard Oil Co. v. FTC.54 
The issue was whether good faith in meeting price competition is an 
absolute defense to a charge of price discrimination under Section 2 of the 
Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.55 Standard un-
questionably was giving four large Detroit gas jobbers more favorable 
prices than their competitors received, favors not justified by any factors 
peculiar to the cost or quantity of the particular sales. The four jobbers 
either retailed the gas themselves or sold it to customer stations in a 
fashion clearly prejudicial to those dealers not receiving the favored price. 
So much was conceded on all sides. 
Prior to the Robinson-Patman Act, discriminatory price cuts to meet 
competition were permitted under the Clayton Act. The Robinson-Fat-
man Act amended this Clayton Act provision to provide that a showing of 
price discrimination made a "prima facie case" of conduct which would 
have the proscribed effect, namely to "substantially lessen competition," 
but that a seller might "rebut" this prima facie case by showing that the 
lower price was "in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competi-
tor." In other words, only that price discrimination which "lessens com-
petition" is illegal, and a seller may rebut the prima facie case of illegality 
53 Sen. Rep. No. 644, 82d Cong. rst Sess. 13 (xgsx). 
54 340 U.S. 231 (1951). See Price Discrimination in Gasoline Marketing: The Detroit Job-
bers Case, I9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. sS (xgsx). 
55 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), IS U.S.C.A. § rs(b) (rgsr). 
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which actual discrimination makes by showing that the discrimination was 
intended to meet existing competition.56 
The exact question then becomes the effect of rebutting a prima facie 
case. The majority, through Justice Burton, held that the rebuttal of a 
prima facie case amounts to a complete defense, so that the law in this 
respect is left exactly as it was before the Robinson-Patman Act was 
passed. The minority, in a tightly reasoned and fully documented opinion 
by Justice Reed, contended that while proof was not overwhelming, it was 
unlikely that Congress had made the change without meaning to make a 
difference; and therefore the FTC was free to find, as it did here, that even 
though the price discriminations were for the purpose of meeting competi-
tion, they still had the illegal effect of lessening competition. 
There is no basis for speculation on practical economic effects of the 
decision. The most likely effect is that it will very slightly increase the ex-
pansion of those large enterprises which are able to play suppliers off 
against each other.s7 
But the decision is of consequence only if one assumes that the trade 
regulatory laws are of consequence in economic life, and this in turn de-
pends on the remedies that attach to those laws. To declare conduct wrong 
is one thing, to do something about it quite something else again. In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has been~ moderately "tough" on substantive 
trade regulation law, but "soft" on remedies.s8 So it was again this year. 
The big remedy case was Timken Roller Bearzng Co. v. United States.s9 
A majority of the Court found that American Timken had conspired with 
British and French Timken, respectively, to eliminate world competition. 
After dealing with the difficult questions of the merits, the Court reached 
the remedy. Justices Black, Douglas, and Minton believed that the solu-
s6 This subject is comprehensively considered in Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, 
and Confusion, 6o Yale L. J. 929 (1951), drawn heavily upon here. See also Adelman, Integra-
tion and the Antitrust Policy, 63 Harv. L. Rev._ 27, 6o-74 (1949). 
s1 Mr. Thomas Austem finds that the decision "contributed only new uncertainties." The 
decision permits discriminatory prices only to meet competition, yet "[i]f one seller inquires 
too intimately into the pricing operations of another, the shadow of the Sherman Act may 
soon enshroud both of them." Again, "if the Indiana opinion means what it appears to say, 
and a lower competitive price may be met only if the seller is assured that it is not in violation 
of the Act, some doubt may exist as to whether the defense which that decision recognizes is 
not somewhat hollow." Austem, Inconsistencies in the Law, 1951 CCH Antitrust Symposium, 
158, 166-68 (1951). 
In Rowe, op. cit. supra note 52, the belief is stated that the Court would not, as it did, have 
"sought to accomplish fundamental change" unless it was prepared to stand on what it had 
done, and continues: "Packing the substantive meeting competition defense with pitfalls for 
the seller would clearly rob the decision of significance." It develops the theories on which the 
defense may become of real value to sellers. 
ss A theme developed briefly in 1947 Term article, 10 et seq. 59 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
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tion was to require American Timken to divest itself of its interests in the 
British and French companies: "[T]he most effective way to suppress 
further Sherman Act violations is to end the intercorporate relationship 
which has been the core of the conspiracy."60 
But on this point the views, not of Justice Black who delivered the 
opinion of the Court, but of the concurring] ustice Reed prevailed. ] ustice 
Reed chose the occasion to release some general strictures, which will 
have the most far reaching consequences, against the remedy of divesti-
ture. He spoke of it as a "harsh remedy," and one "not to be used indis-
criminately." It should not be used where "other effective remedies, less 
harsh, are available." What then is the preferred remedy? "The injunction 
is a far stronger sanction against further violation than the Sherman Act 
alone," a conclusion evidenced by the "paucity of cases dealing with con-
tempt of Sherman Act injunctions." The injunction "leaves power in the 
court to enforce divestiture, if the injunction alone fails. Prompt and full 
complicance with the decree should be anticipated."6r 
This general attitude, which will dominate the lower courts hereafter, 
probably spells an end to frequent attempts to use the divestiture remedy 
in any case except that of major monopolies. This is an important develop-
P'!ent, for, with criminal sanctions too small to be consequential, a corpora-
tion can commit almost any practices (short of complete monopolization) 
with confidence that the most it can suffer is to be told by injunction to 
stop.62 Is not such a command too little and too late to make any differ-
ence to Timken? 
In the related field of patents, two gadget cases attracted a dispropor-
tionate amount of attention. In one, the issue was the validity of a patent 
on a cashier's counter rack used by A. & P. grocery stores to move gro-
ceries from the end of a counter to a position in front of the cashier.6J The 
device consists of a three-sided frame without top or bottom, kept on the 
counter by guides. When in position at the end of the counter, it permits 
the customer to unload his groceries into the frame which can then be 
pulled forward in front of the cashier for checking. That the device is 
useful is not doubted; that it ranks with the invention of, say, the tele-
graph, no one believes. 
6o Ibid., at 6oo. 6• Ibid., at 6or-6os. 
62 See, e.g., the famous Hartford-Empire memorandum, including the passage: "I ... do 
not see much danger of having any of these deals upset .... If they are upset, I still believe 
that by that time, we will be in a better position even with such dissolution than we would 
be otherwise; and I see no danger whatsoever of any criminal liability .... "Hartford-Empire 
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 437, 438 (r945). 
6J Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. I47 (rgso). 
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The Court recognized that the rack is a good idea, "but scores of pro-
gressive ideas in business are not patentable," and neither is this one. 
Justice Douglas, concurring, seized the opportunity to spank the Patent 
Office for issuing ridiculous patents: "The patent involved in the present 
case belongs to this list of incredible patents which the Patent Office has 
spawned. The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one has 
to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared invalid dramatically 
illustrates how far our patent system frequently departs from the con-
stitutional standards which are supposed to govern."64 
Later in the term the Court disposed of an even sillier patent by revers-
ing without opinion a Seventh Circuit decision which had upheld a patent 
on a most deceptive toy pig. The pig, which perched in most unlikely 
fashion on the edge of a child's breakfast bowl, its tail buried in cereal, 
could be given each alternate spoonful of cereal ("See, Junior, piggy takes 
a spoonful, too"), which it then deposited through its tail back in the 
bowl.65 
These reversals, and particularly the Douglas concurrence, called forth 
the wrath of the patent bar faithful. Several writers took the position that 
gadget patents were affirmatively desirable and that the standard of in-
vention should not be set so high as to preclude them. An historical argu-
ment was advanced that as of I787, gadget patents were the norm, the 
convenient oddities in Thomas Jefferson's bedroom at Monticello being 
pointed to as examples.66 That the Patent Office would continue to go its 
Supreme Court-ignoring, gadget-granting way was hinted in a Journal of 
the Patent Office Society article: "What effect this admonition will have 
on the Patent Office remains to be seen."67 
64 Ibid., at I 53. rsS. 
6s Trager v. Crest Specialty, 184 F. 2d 577 (rgso), rev'd without opinion, 341 U.S. 912 
rgsr). The article of the alleged infringer was slightly different-his toy was a puppy instead 
of a pig._ 
66 As it is put by Gregg, Some New Patent Cases, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 6or, 6o7 (rgsr), the A. & 
P. "case had, for friends of the patent system, somewhat the effect and shock of a cold shower 
after the warm and relaxing bath" of decisions of the year before. Examples of the historical 
argument are Siggers, Comments on Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 33 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 83 
(rgsr), giving Jefferson's bed as an example of a sound patent; Holbrook, Science v. Gadgets, 
33 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 87 (rgsr). 
61 Brodoer, Gadget Patents, 33 J. Pat. Off. Soc. ro2, ro3 (rgsr). For several pages support-
ing the conclusion that "the Patent Office takes virtually every possible attitude about their 
consistent rebukes from the courts except one: nowhere does one find evidence of a resolution 
to conform to the statutes as interpreted by the judiciary. The attitude, rather, is that the 
courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, are The Enemy, to be thwarted by every in-
genuity of which the Office is capable," see 1938 Term article, 19-24. 
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OTHER PROBLEMS OF BUSINESS 
a) Color TV 
The color TV case/8 though of no particular legal difficulty or signifi-
cance, was of major public concern because of the great interest in every-
thing respecting television. At issue was the validity of an order of the 
Federal Communications Commission setting standards for the transmis-
sion of color television. The Commission had selected the CBS system, and 
rejected the RCA system. Since all conceded the Commission's power to 
make orders on this subject, the only serious question was whether the 
particular order was arbitrary and capricious. 
Enormous briefs (225 pages for RCA, 150 for the government and 
CBS) discussed the technicalities of the order and the details of the sys-
tem, their :flicker, brightness, color :fidelity, picture texture, and suscepti-
bility to interference. But the mass of details only made more obvious the 
difficulty of the issues before the FCC, and the impossibility of terming 
their resolution capricious. Hence Justice Black, in an opinion unanimous 
but for Justice Frankfurter, in a few words upheld the Commission. 
The principal effect of the decision is to give a go-ahead signal to CBS-
type color, which in tum requires the viewer to buy an adjusting device. 
Two small boys in New Jersey immediately announced that they had 
made one for less than a dollar. By summer's end, industry opposition to 
the CBS system appeared to be declining, as beginning experimental 
broadcasts had been made. Attention turned to such wonders of the new 
medium as the lady who had been pictured eight times a day holding an 
apple during the experimental process.69 
b) Transportation 
A miscellany of cases have very little in common except that they all 
involve transportation of goods. 
Five were cases of state or local regulation challenged under the com-
merce or import-export clauses. Two opinions by Justice Clark represent 
conscientious efforts to make as explicit as possible the factors which limit 
and permit state controls. In Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas 
68 Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951). See "Public Interest" 
and the Market in Color Television Regulation, x8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 8o2 (1951). 
69 "Patty Painter, a twenty-two-year-old, five-foot-one-inch, ninety-five-pound, hazel-
eyed, ash-blond young woman whose complexion is pure cream and whose lips are a bright 
ruby red, is one of the unsung pioneers of C.B.S. color television. To Miss Painter has fallen 
the historic task of just standing or sitting around-eight hours a day for the past five years-
in front of C.B.S. experimental color cameras .... "New Yorker, p. 20 (Aug. n, 1951). 
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Co.70 the issue was the power of the state to set prices on gas produced 
within its borders and sold interstate. The validity of such state price 
regulation, said Clark, depends on three tests: "that the regulation not 
discriminate against or place an embargo on interstate commerce, that it 
safeguard an obvious state interest, and that the local interest at stake 
outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the prevention of 
state restrictions."71 He then squarely faced each of these questions on the 
facts of this case, deciding each in favor of the state. 
Of particular significance in the Cities Service case was the _emphasis on 
the non-discriminatory nature of the price regulation, and the restatement 
of the 1949 decision of H. P. Hood&' Sons, Inc. 'II. Du Monit72 solely in 
terms of discrimination. The weight attached to this factor by Justice 
Clark was more fully developed in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,73 in which 
his opinion for the Court heid invalid a Madison, Wisconsin milk insp~c­
tion ordinance which in effect barred all Illinois milk, as well as some Wis-
consin milk, from the Madison market. His technique of stating the issue 
gave great clarity to the problem: "Our issue then is whether the dis-
crimination inherent in the Madison ordinance can be justified in view of 
the character of the local interests and the available methods of protecting 
them."74 He then explained that adequate and non-discriminatory al-
ternatives were available. 
Unfortunately for both common sense and clarity, Justice Clark wrote 
only; the dissenting opinions in the other two major negative implication 
cases. One of them, Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor75 case, is none-
theless a classic example of a different point of view. That weary litiga-
tion, challenging 1935-1940 Connecticut corporation taxes, finally was 
decided after a judicial journey which had taken it to the United States 
Supreme Court twice and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors once. 
Spector is a Missouri corporation engaged in interstate trucking. Con-
necticut attempted to apply to it the state's general corporation tax, 
:figured on the basis of net income as traced to that portion of the business 
done in the state. Justice Burton for the Supreme Court held the tax in-
valid. He made no objection to the amount of the tax or its method of com-
putation. Rather the tax was invalid for one reason" alone: the Connecticut 
7• 340 u.s. 179 (1950). 71 Ibid., at 186-87. 
12 336 U.S. 525 (1949). In Cities Service, the Court said, "The vice in the regulation in-
validated by Hood was solely that it denied facilities to a company in interstate co=erce on 
the articulated ground that such facilities would divert milk supplies needed by local consum-
ers; in other words, the regulation discriminated against interstate co=erce." 340 U.S. 179, 
I88 (1950). 
73 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 74 Ibid., at 354· 75 340 U.S. 602 (1951). 
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Supreme Court had described the tax as one "on the corporation's fran-
chise for the privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate transportation 
in the state."76 
It did not matter that the tax was non-discriminatory, applying equally 
to local corporations doing local business. It did not matter that the iden-
tical amount of tax could have been collected, concededly, from the same 
company, as compensation for use of the highways, or in lieu of a property 
tax, or as a tax for inspection, or sales, or use. 77 The vital factor was the 
label placed on the tax by the state: "Even though the financial burden on 
interstate commerce might be the same, the question whether a state may 
validly make interstate commerce pay its way depends :first of all upon the 
constitutional channel through which it attempts to do so."78 
The decision deserves whole-hearted applause for its clarity and candor, 
and not in satirical or grudging vein. Until now, critics of the decisions in 
this branch of taxation had been confused as to whether the validity of 
state taxes of this general sort did depend solely on the form of words with 
which they were described by the state, or, in the alternative, whether 
there was some functional principle of policy involved. 79 But this decision 
indubitably cuts through substance to form. It is now, for the :first time, 
completely clear that the whole problem is simply a matter of words, and 
no state need make Connecticut's mistake again. Indeed, Connecticut has 
already changed the wording of its act, leaving the rate and the incidence 
exactly as they were before. 80 
But, as Justice Clark pointed out in dissent for Justices Black and 
Douglas as well, it is an expensive lesson in draftsmanship: "It has taken 
76 I35 Conn. 37, s6, 6x A. 2d 89, 98 (I948). 
77 These are the alternatives enumerated in the opinion. 
7& Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 6o2, 6o8 (x9sx). 
79 The confusion among students of the subject on this point was precipitated anew by 
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (x946) and Int'l Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 4I6 (x947), 
in which conflicting results appeared to be reached at the same term of court because of di-
vergent wording but similar incidence in the two tax statutes involved. This puzzlement is 
reflected, e.g., in Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 Col. L. Rev. 
2n, 226 (I94 7) where he comments on the Freeman case: "If the quoted language meant mere-
ly to indicate one of the phrases forbidden to state tax draftsmen, it reduces constitutional 
principle to a formulary riddle; if advanced as a sincere attempt at judicial statement of the 
constitutional principle, it merely reinstates an ancient stumbling block and foresakes both 
goals of good terminology: utility and clear purpose." 
so Connecticut met words with words. It added to the tax provision involved the following: 
The tax ''shall be paid by such corporations or associations for the benefit and protection of the 
government and laws of this state, it being the purpose of this section to require the payment 
of a tax by all corporations or associations carrying on or doing business in this state, but not 
organized under the laws of this state, as an additional recompense for protection of the activi-
ties in this state of such corporations or associations." Conn. Pub. Act. No. 350 (I9SI). 
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eight years and eight courts to bring this battered litigation to an end. 
The taxes involved go back thirteen years. It is therefore no answer to 
Connecticut and some thirty other states who have similar tax measures 
that they can now collect the same revenues by enacting laws more 
felicitously drafted. Because of its failure to use the right tag, Connecticut 
cannot collect from Spector for the years 1937 to date, and it and other 
states may well have past collections taken away and turned into taxpayer 
bonanzas by suits for refund which come within the respective statutes of 
limitations. "8' 
Other cases of casual interest in transportation are Alabama Great 
Southern R. Co. v. United States,82 a cogent opinion by Justice Minton re-
viewing the factors which the ICC must take into consideration in setting 
differentials between rail and barge rates; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line 
Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n,83 upholding the power of Michigan 
to regulate interstate gas sales to industrial users; and United States v. 
Champlin Refining Co.,84 which is so ungainly a disposition of a precedent 
as to deserve further comment on its technique alone. In an earlier case 
involving the same company,85 the Court had held that the company was 
required to file reports under Section 19a · of the Interstate Commerce 
Act.86 Justices Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Burton had then dis-
sented. In the instant case, the issue was whether the same company could 
be required to :file further reports under Section 20 of the Act, 87 and rate 
schedules under Section 6.88 All three of these sections purport to cover 
"every common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter." That 
phrase is defined in Section I of the Act to include "all pipe line com-
panies."89 In other words, the coverage clause is identical for the section 
earlier interpreted, and for the two sections now interpreted. In logic, all 
should stand or fall together. · 
Justice Clark for the Court achieved the remarkable result of affirming 
that Section 19, previously held applicable, was still applicable; that 
Section 2o, now in issue, was applicable; and that Section 6, now in issue, 
was ·not applicable. He conceded that "the literal terms of the statute lend 
81 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 6o2, 614 (1951). 
~2 340 U.S. 216 (1951). 
83 341 U.S. 329 (1951). 
84 341 U.S. 290 (1951). 
8s Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 329 U.S. 29 (I946). 
86 37 Stat. 70I (1913), 49 U.S.C.A. § I9a (I95r). 
87 24 Stat. 386 (I887), 49 U.S.C.A. § I (I929). 
88 24 Stat. 38o (I887), 49 U.S.C.A. § 6 (1929). 
87 24 Stat. 379 (I887), 49 U.S.C.A. § I (I929). 
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some weight" to the view that the three should be interpreted consistent-
ly; but "at the same time, we find it hard to conclude, despite the general-
ity of the statutory terms used,"90 that Congress meant to make Section 6 
applicable to the same pipe lines to which the other sections were ap-
plicable. The four Justices who had dissented in the earlier case concurred 
with Justice Clark-on the more logical ground that the earlier case should 
be overruled. Justice Black dissented. 
Two handsomely turned admiralty cases complete the transportation 
collection. In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,9' the issue 
was the interpretation of a war risk insurance clause of ancient English 
lineage. Justice Black for the Court declined to follow the English deci-
sions automatically ("our practice is no more than to accord respect to 
established doctrines of English maritime law")/' and approved applica-
tion of American proximate cause principles. In the more significant 
Warren v. U1tited Sta.tes,93 Justice Douglas for the Court wrote that a sea-
man negligently injured while disporting himself on shore leave was none-
theless entitled to maintenance and cure unless his negligence was so gross 
as to amount to wilful misbehavior. The case seems an inevitable exten-
sion of the leading modem case on injuries in service of the ship, Aguilar v. 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey.94 
III. CIVIL RIGHTS 
a) Speech or Politics 
In this space a year ago, I advanced a cyclical theory of American civil 
liberties history. That theory was that civil liberties history parallels eco-
nomic history, but with a peculiar belatedness. Every twenty or thirty 
years, we experience an economic Depression, and every twenty to thirty 
years we also experience a civil liberties Repression. The Repressions fol-
low about twenty years after the Depressions. The discussion concluded: 
Personnel changes in the late forties now reopen the question of whether we are 
about to abandon the course begun by the coalescence of Hughes and Roberts with 
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone. It may well be that we are about to return to the 
doctrines of the twenties.9S 
9• United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290, 295, 297 (1951). 
9' 340 U.S. 54 (1950). 92 Ibid., at 59· 93 340 U.S. 523 (1951). 
94 318 U.S. 724 (1943). Transportation cases not discussed in the text were Norton Co. v. 
Dep't Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951), invalidating an TI!inois retailer's occupation tax insofar 
as it applied to orders sent to, and filled from, an out-of-state manufacturer's home office; and 
Canton R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 5II (1951) holding valid under the Import-Export clause a 
Maryland gross receipts tax as applied to a railroad engaged in moving goods from trunk 
railroads to ships in foreign trade. 
95 1949 Term article, at 21. 
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At the October 1950 term, the Supreme Court recaptured and outdid 
the spirit of 1925. It decided Dennis v. United States,96 a decision of the 
broadest social significance of many years. The decision affirmed the con-
viction of II Communists. By mid-summer, 65 more were under indict-
ment as part of the same conspiracy. By official Department of Justice 
estimate, the decision may result in 12,ooo political prisoners within a 
short time.97 The catch will far outstrip any collection of political prison-
ers in previous American history, and will doubtless far surpass any im-
prisonments of that sort ever made by a democratic country.98 The pro-
found question, of course, is whether upon achievement of that dubious 
glory we shall still remain a democratic country. 
The issue was the validity of the Smith Act99 as applied to the principal 
leaders of the Communist Party. The defendants were charged with con-
spiring to organize that Party as a society to teach and advocate the over-
throw of the government by force and violence, and themselves to have 
advocated and taught the duty of overthrowing the government. Overt 
acts other than teaching and advocacy are not alleged: the defendants 
would initiate a revolution "as speedily as circumstances would permit, "roo 
but that time is concededly not now. 
With eight Justices participating, there were :five opinions. Two were 
dissents, by Justices Black and Douglas respectively. The main opinion 
was the Chief Justice's, joined by Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton. 
Two were concurrences by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, but con-
currences in the judgment of affirmance only, and not in the Vinson 
opinion. 
In the interest of reasonable brevity, the two concurrences may be put 
aside in a few words. Certainly the most learned of all the opinions is that 
of Justice Frankfurter. It is approximately as long as all the other opinions 
put together, and is replete with allusions to a letter by Jefferson to Abigail 
Adams, the legislation of Virginia on the Alien and Sedition Acts as re-
96 34I U.S. 494 (I95I). 
97 "There is a program" to prosecute "roughly I2,ooo members of the Communist Party." 
Testimony of Acting Ass't Att'y Gen., Hearings Before Subcommittee on Appropriations, 
H.R., 82d Cong. Ist Sess. 336 (I95I). 
98 The number of persons indicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts was IS, and the 
number convicted under World War I sedition legislation was 900. Emerson, Essay on Free-
dom, II Lawyers Guild Rev. I, 4-5 (I9SI). If the "relocated" Japanese of World War II be 
counted as political rather than racial prisoners, then the country will probably not reach its 
former high since the Japanese numbered almost Ioo,ooo. There were, of course, some distinc-
tions between relocation and prison. 
99 54 Stat. 67I (I940), IS U.S.C.A. § rr (I950). 
Ioo From the charge of the trial judge, as quoted in Dennis v. United States, 34I U.S. 494, 
5IO (I95I). 
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ported in Tucker's Blackstone (I8os), The (London) Times, and every 
case ever decided on the subject at hand. This opinion is the very epitome 
of intellectual liberalism at its most ineffective. It is in two major parts, 
the :first part setting forth at length that judges are powerless to stop 
Congresses from behaving this way; and the second regretting that this is 
so because: "Without open minds there can be no open society. And if 
society be not open the spirit of man is mutilated and becomes en-
slaved."IOI What it all comes to is that intellectual non-restraint has the 
Frankfurter intellectual sympathy, but not his vote. 
There is no such dull edge to the Jackson concurrence. He, too, doubts 
that the government will do the slightest good by its prosecutions of Com-
munists. ("Communism will not go to jail with these Communists. No 
decision by this Court can forestall revolution whenever the existing gov-
ernment fails to command the respect and loyalty of the people.")102 But 
he has no doubts at all of the government's power. The Holmes-Brandeis 
clear and present danger approach to freedom of speech Jackson thinks 
irrelevant to Communism because it antedates Communism as a nation-
wide conspiracy; that approach is suitable only for "trivialities" such as 
"a hot-headed speech on a street comer," a parade, a pamphlet distribu-
tion, or something equally insignificant. The core of this offense is con-
spiracy, and what one might do by himself (and hence ineffectively) he 
cannot necessarily do with others. The "clear and present danger" test is 
totally irrelevant to a conspiracy charge. No overt act is needed because 
none is ever needed when conspiracy is the offense. The central proposi-
tion seems to be that the government can punish any conspiracy to do an 
act where the act itself would be punishable; and it is immaterial that the 
conspiracy may be political advocacy of an act which may never occur.103 
The main opinion by the Chief Justice is less circumspect than Frank-
furter's, less cavalier than Jackson's. It makes these central points: 
,., Ibid., at ss6. '02 Ibid., at 578. 
103 Mr. John Raeburn Green, distinguished St. Louis attorney, in a petition for rehearing for 
one of the defendants, says of the Jackson position: "The conspiracy proposal, no matter 
how much Mr. Justice Jackson himself would attempt to limit it, puts an end to enforcement 
of any of these freedoms, except for extraordinary cases of individual speech. Few, if any, of 
the numerous First Amendment cases with which this Court has dealt were cases of an indi-
vidual speaking for any by himself alone, without prior consultation with anyone. In our 
modern world, scarcely anything is done without 'conspiracy,' that is, without a planning 
agreement, or understanding of two or more persons .... With deference, it is suggested 
that this doctrine would make it possible for legislation to avoid the impact of the First Amend-
ment, to destroy the free exercise of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and 
(except in extraordinary cases where an individual speaks without consultation with anyone 
else) freedom of speech." Separate Petition for Rehearing of John Gates at 2I, 22, Dennis v. 
United States (I9SI). 
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(I) Congress unquestionably has power to suppress armed rebellion, and 
it likewise has the power to suppress preparation for such rebellion. "Ad-
vocacy" of such a course is different from mere "discussion" of it, and 
Congress aimed here at advocacy rather than discussion. (2) Upon review 
of the cases, it is clear that the Holmes and Brandeis views in the leading 
cases of Gitlow v. New Y ork104 and Whitney v. California105 are sound, those 
of the majority in those cases unsound.106 The Court, the Chief Justice 
implies, adheres to the "clear and present danger" test as those two Jus-
tices formulated it. But that test does not require a probability of success 
of a revolution, or an instantaneous imminence. (3) Enlarging upon this 
latter point, the issue, as Judge Learned Hand below said, is "whether the 
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such inva-
sion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." And "[w]e are in 
accord with ... the trial court's finding that the requisite danger ex-
isted."107 This (4) is a question of law, for the court rather than the jury to 
decide. 
The dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas are wholly dif-
ferent from each other. Both agree that the Vinson opinion, though in 
form adhering to the Holmes formula, in fact departs from it. But Black 
suggests that he would, if necessary, advance a new test. In his view, the 
First Amendment, "at least as to speech in the realm of public matters" is 
an absolute. In that ar~a, the "mere 'reasonableness' " of a restraint on 
speech is no justification for it. Rather, the First Amendment deserves a 
"high preferred place ... in a free society."108 
This approach by Justice Black moves toward an absolute protection 
of political speech. It represents the intensely practical judgment that 
once judges can tailor that freedom to the demands of the moment, they 
reduce the Amendment to a high-sounding platitudinous admonition. 
Where freedom is involved, Black, unlike many liberals, is willing to em-
brace an absolute. Certainly it is true that I6o years of experience with the 
Amendment interpreted as subject to qualifications has in fact left it of 
very little use at times of stress. 
The Douglas dissent is a conscientious attempt to apply the clear and 
present danger test as developed by Holmes and Brandeis in the Gitlow 
10
4 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 105 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
106"Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the ma-
jority opinions in those, there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the 
Holmes-Brandeis rationale." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951). 
107 Ibid., at 510. 
10s Ibid., at 579-81. The parallel of the Black views to those of Meiklejohn, Free Speech 
(1948), is notable, and may account for Justice Frankfurter's text and extended footnote 5, 
summarizing and criticizing Meiklejohn's stand. Ibid., at 524. 
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and Whitney cases. Unlike Black, Douglas concedes the power to limit 
speech, but believes that this is no occasion for it. What these defendants 
have done is to "teach" certain doctrines. "Not a single seditious act is 
charged in the indictment." Speech itself can be limited, but only when 
the utterances are in circumstances in which the resort to reason is no 
antidote. Mere "advocacy" can never be lawless, except where it would be 
immediately acted upon. Yet these defendants, though part of a move-
ment powerful elsewhere, are utterly innocuous here: "In America they 
are miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; their wares remain unsold. 
The fact that their ideas are abhorrent does not make them powerful."'"9 
True, though small in number, the Communists might be so powerful by 
location in strategic areas that we must fear, and suppress them. "But the 
record is silent on these facts." If we must rely on judicial notice (which 
we should not do for we should have facts before us), I believe "that the 
invisible army of petitioners is the best known, the most beset, and the 
least thriving of any :fifth column in history. Only those held by fear or 
panic could think otherwise." 
It remains to criticize the main opinions, and to calculate their conse-
quences. , 
Even the attempted objectivity of summary will not have disguised the 
sense that, to this reviewer, the Vinson opinion is a disaster in the history 
of democracy.n• 
r. The issues at stake in this great controversy outweigh mere prece-
dents, and our college of elders cannot be expected or desired to resolve 
them solely on the basis of what has gone before. But, as a footnote in the 
history of ideas, we should at least record that the Vinson opinion claims a 
' 09 The quotations in this paragraph are from the Douglas dissent, ibid., at sSI--()2. 
no This is certainly not tbe common view. It is shared by the St. Louis Post Dispatch, which, 
in an editorial of June s, I9SI, p. 2c, col. 2, described the majority opinions under the heading 
"Six Men Amend the Constitution": "Never before has such a restriction been placed on the 
right to hold opinions and to express them in the United States of America." And the New 
York Post, commenting upon the second Communist case begun after the Dennis decision, 
said, June 21, I9SI, "Does anyone seriously believe this republic is too weak to withstand the 
propaganda of the Communist? Does anyone seriously argue that the mere advocacy of Com-
munist ideas carries the threat of ultimate democratic destruction? Only paranoiacs harbor 
those terrors .... It is easy to imitate the enemy. But in the long run we believe the citizens of 
this Republic-and free men everywhere-will come to revere Justices Black and Douglas and 
others like them who refused to join the stampede." 
The American Civil Liberties Union, Civil Liberties v. The Smith Act (I9SI) (pamphlet), 
said: "The ACLU disagrees fundamentally with the Supreme Court's 6-2 decision. The Union, 
as always, opposes this law because it infringes upon the rights of free speech guaranteed by 
the First Amendment and because it is dangerously unwise legislation .... The ACLU stands 
ready to help obtain an overruling of the June 4th decision .... " 
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lineage from Holmes and Brandeis which it does not have.m The voice is 
Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau. 
But there is no real lack of candor here. The Chief Justice in the final 
analysis distinguishes Holmes and Brandeis: They "were concerned in 
Gitlow" with "a comparatively isolated event bearing little relation in 
their minds to any substantial threat to the safety of the community."m 
Hence, by implication I suppose, they may be forgiven a little hyperbole. 
The fact is that there is nothing in the current situation which Holmes 
and Brandeis do not seem to have contemplated. In Gitlow, Holmes would 
require "[a] present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by 
force .... If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictator-
ship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, 
the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance 
and have their way .... An attempt to induce an uprising against the 
government at once and not at some indefinite time in the future ... 
would have presented a different question."n3 
In Whitney, Brandeis said that speech might be suppressed only if the 
danger were "serious," "imminent": "In order to support a finding of 
clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious 
violence was to be expected or was advocated."n4 
To find in these passages the remotest resemblance to the present posi-
tion of the Court is to deny that the English language is capable of ex-
pressing differences. For at the very instant that reason was routing this 
miserable conspiracy, the law has intervened. us 
2. At the same time, the opinion is not as restrictive of free speech as 
the Gitlow majority holding which it discountenances. This is particularly 
important becau-se of the very heavy reliance of the government on that 
case.n6 
Gitlow did hold that any utterances advocating overthrow of the gov-
ernment were punishable without any regard for the likelihood of the 
words having consequences. The Smith Act was modeled on the Gitlow 
statute. In the Dennis case, the Vinson opinion tries to split the difference 
between the Gitlow majority and the Holmes-Brandeis dissent. It differs 
m For clear analysis and support of the Holmes-Brandeis views see Nathanson, The Com-
munist Trial and the Clear-and-Present-Danger Test, 63 Harv. L. Rev. n67 (1950). 
112 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). 
na Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925). 
n4 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
ns The thought is suggested by the Douglas dissent, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494, 589 (1951), which describes the factors making for the decline of the Party. 
n 6 A :flat reliance on Gitlow was a major part of the government brief. 
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from the Gitlow majority in two vital respects: (a) In the Vinson opinion, 
following Judge Hand, the precise issue is "whether the gravity of the 
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free 
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger" ;m and (b) the Court, not the 
legislature, determines that matter. 
In other words, the Gitlow rule made valid any statute punishing ad-
vocacy of overthrow of the government. The Holmes-Brandeis view would 
make such a statute valid only if the likelihood of that result were im-
mediate and pressing. The Vinson opinion makes such a statute valid if, 
on the facts as reviewed by the court, there is some appreciable probability 
of that result at some remote point in time. 
The Dennis case is not as bad as it might be in one other respect; it at 
least leaves the issue of "political guilt" a personal one, to be decided from 
case to case. It is not a blanket decision which means automatically that 
every member of the dissenting group must go to jail. It stresses as the 
central issue of the case the "application of the statute to the particular 
situation," and emphasizes the leadership position of the particular de-
fendants. By its strong emphasis in note 6, and the accompanying text, on 
Justice Brandeis' discussion in the Whitney case of the defendant's privi-
lege to show, on the facts, a want of clear and present danger, the Court 
preserves the right to other defendants to make a similar, individualized 
showing. 
3· The Holmes-Brandeis-Douglas position, or in the alternative the 
Black position, is right. Yet one says so under the inherent handicap that 
they have said it so much better than anyone else could that to agree is to 
parrot. Justice Douglas has set out comprehensively the reasons which 
led him to dissent, and his argument will ring for some with eternal con-
viction. 
Let us face the ultimate question: Why should we tolerate the Com-
munist yammer? Why endure voices of those who would gag us, given the 
opportunity? 
There is the legal answer: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press." 
There is the historical answer, well blended with the practical answer: 
"Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything, 
and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press. It has accord-
ingly been decided by the practice of the States, that it is better to leave a 
few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning 
\ 
n1 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). 
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them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits."n8 
Behind that :figure of speech lies the greatest wisdom. Mankind has 
never learned the art of suppressing by Iittles. The violence of the spirit 
of suppression too quickly reaches beyond the truly wicked to mere non-
conformists. Holmes saw the reason: It is because the distinction between 
advocacy and incitement, or in this case between education and advocacy, 
can not in practice be made. "The only difference between the expression 
of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's 
enthusiasm for the result."n9 
Finally, there is the moral answer. "Persecution for the expression of 
opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your 
premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you 
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To 
allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech 
impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you 
do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your 
power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset 
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they be-
lieve the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth 
is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely 
can be carried out."120 
Those answers give the Douglas conclusion: The Russians suppress free-
dom of speech. We must not. "Our faith should be that our people will 
never give support to these advocates of revolution, so long as we remain 
loyal to the purposes for which our Nation was founded."I2I 
They lead to Black's hope "that in calmer times, when present pres-
sures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the 
First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong 
in a free society."•22 
The most familiar argument of the free speech liberal is that one abuse 
leads to another, that greater infringements follow lesser, that by "prun-
ing away the noxious branches" the "vigour of those yielding their proper 
fruits" is lessened. 
us Report on the Virginia Resolutions, IV Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 
544 (!867). 
"9 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (x925). 
120 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 6x6, 630 (I9I9). 
'
2
' Dennis v. United States, 34I U.S. 494, 5xo (I95I). ""Ibid., at 58x. 
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The truth of those fundamentals is never better demonstrated than to-
day. We learn again that political purges catch up the innocuous with the 
sinister. Since the Smith Act made red hunting a nationally respectable 
sport, many have become eager to join the pack. Loyalty programs and 
oath requirements have spread from "sensitive areas" of the national gov-
ernment to all of its branches; the states and municipalities have followed 
suit; and, encouraged by the Taft-Hartley Act, private industry and labor 
unions have established political tests not for the right of holding sig-
nificant posts~ but for the privilege of earning a living at all. We shall, if 
we can, starve the Reds we don't jail; and since we define the offense so 
casually, many non-Reds are victimized in the process. 
That process was encouraged this year by the Court's decisions in the 
political oath cases. The two cases of Gerende v. Bd. of Supervisors123 and 
Gamer v. Bd. of Public Works124 will vastly increase the oath-taking fad. 
In Gerende, the issue was the validity of a Maryland requirement that 
candidates for public office in elections take oath that they are not (a) 
presently engaged in attempting to overthrow the government; or (b) are 
knowingly members of such an organization. The two ingredients thus are 
either overt acts, or membership in an organization doing such overt acts, 
with scienter. This the Court unanimously upheld. 
The careful limitations of the Gerende oath are not present in Garner, 
involving the Los Angeles oath for municipal employees. The Los Angeles 
oath required in 1949 has these elements: The employee must swear that 
he has not (a) for :five years past (b) advised, advocated, or taught over-
throw of the government; and that he has not (c) been a member of an 
organization with such purposes in that time, or (d) been "affiliated" with 
such an organization; and (e) he will not be guilty of such conduct in the 
future. This oath requirement of 1949 was based on a 1941 amendment to 
the Los Angeles charter by the California legislature which forbade the 
enumerated types of conduct, but provided no sanction. The principal 
challenge was that the oath requirement is a bill of attainder. 
The three leading bill of attainder cases are Cummi1tgs v. Missomi,r•s ex 
parte Garland,'"6 and United States v. Lovett.127 "A bill of attainder is ... a 
legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial," according 
to Cummings.'"8 Cummings and Garland were, respectively, a priest and a 
123 34I u.s. s6 (I9SI). 125 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277 (r867). 
"4 34r U.S. 716 (r9sr). 126 4 Wall. (U.S.) 383 (r867). 
127 328 U.S. 303 (1946). For discussion of these cases in terms of the contemporary situa-
tion, see Wormuth, On Bills of Attainder, 3 West. Pol. Q. 52 (r95o). 
128 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277, 287 (r867). 
HeinOnline  -- 19 U. Chi. L. Rev.  194 1951-1952
194 THE UNIVERSITY OF CffiCAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. I9 
lawyer who would have been precluded from the practice of their profes-
sions by state or federal requirements that they take oaths that they had 
not, in effect, supported the Confederacy. In Lovett, three government em-
ployees were stricken from the federal payroll by the Congress. In all three 
cases the oath requirements or the payroll exclusion were held bills of 
attainder. 
Those cases were distinguished by Justice Clark for the Court's major-
ity on the ground that, following the Cummings quotation above, "punish-
ment is a prerequisite," and no "punishment is imposed by a general regu-
lation which merely provides standards of qualification and eligibility for 
employment." The legislation in the instant case was found analagous not 
to that of the Cummings and Garland cases, but rather to perfectly per-
missible legislation such as "a statute elevating standards of qualification 
to practice medicine." The Lovett legislation was distinguished on the 
ground that it "named individual employees" rather than establishing 
"general and prospectively operative standards."129 
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting as to the oath, emphasized the differ-
ences between this and Gerende. There, present conduct and scienter were 
required. Here the requirement is retroactive, there was originally no re-
quirement of scienter;130 and since "affiliation" is differentiated from 
"membership" by the terms of the oath, its meaning is particularly misty. 
Justice Burton dissented flatly on the ground of conflict with the three bill 
of attainder cases.1 31 
Justice Douglas, for Justice Black as well, analyzed the bill of attainder 
cases in some detail and found the Los Angeles oath squarely within them: 
"Petitioners were disqualified from office not for what they are today, not 
because of any program they currently espouse, not because of standards 
related to fitness for the offi{:e but for what they once advocated. They are 
deprived of their livelihood by legislative act, not by judicial process."132 
It is indeed astonishing that the majority is unable to see any significant 
difference between the exclusion from public office of a person who four-
and-one-half years earlier was "affiliated with" an undesirable organiza-
tion, on the one hand, and a statute putting present requirements for the 
practice of medicine. As Justice Burton said, the ordinance "leaves no 
room for a change of heart."13~ 
129 The quotations in this paragraph are from Gamer v. Bd. of Public Works, 341 U.S. 
716, 722-23 (rgsr) and the case cited as illustration of the power to raise medical standards 
is Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. II4 (r88g). 
13° The Court modified the ordinance by its own interpretation, and read in a requirement 
of scienter as well as other limitations. Gamer v. Bd. of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723 (rgsr). 
l3l Ibid., at 735-36. I32 Ibid. 133 Ibid., at 729. 
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Its significance is ominous. In the words of Justice Frankfurter: "If this 
ordinance is sustained, sanction is given to like oaths for every govern-
mental unit in the United States. Not only does the oath make an irra-
tional demand. It is bound to operate as a real deterrent to people con-
templating even innocent associations."'34 
Against the wind of opinions such as Dennis and Garner stood one straw. 
It was Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, ' 35 challenging the 
Attorney General's subversive list. 
Three organizations sought declaratory judgments and injunctions for 
removal of their names from the list. The list itself is prepared by the De-
partment of Justice for the immediate use of the federal loyalty board, and 
purports to be a listing of "totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive" 
organizations or those which have "adopted a policy of advocating or ap-
proving the commission of acts of force or violence."'36 The list in fact, 
however, has far wider circulation than to the loyalty board alone, and is 
used by state and local governments and by private organizations as an 
enumeration of proscribed organizations!37 
Inclusion on the list is so deleterious to an organization that Justice 
Burton, in the only majority opinion joined by two Justices, held that the 
Attorney General would be required to justify his listings in the courts. 
The issue, it is vital to note, rose on the government's motion to dismiss 
the complaints of the organizations. The complaints, which sought re-
moval of each of the three organizations from the list, alleged that the 
organizations were blameless, and that their inclusion on the list was an 
arbitrary act. The government, by its motion to dismiss, necessarily con-
ceded the truth of these allegations, contending that the listings were not 
open to judicial review. The result of the Burton ruling is to send the cases 
to trial, at which the government will have to make a showing of the 
grounds for the inclusion of these organizations. 
The main point of this holding is that the Attorney General may not 
make "patently arbitrary" listings. This the Executive Order authorizing 
the listings did not contemplate, and therefore no constitutional issue is 
reached. "The doctrine of administrative construction never has been car-
ried so far as to permit administrative discretion to run riot."'38 The issue 
is justifiable because the listing is "defamatory" and most injurious to 
'Js 341 U.S. 1:z3 (1951). 1 36 13 Fed. Reg. 1471, 1473 (1948). 
1 37 For a recent discussion of use of such lists see Barrett, The Tenney Committee (1951); 
and for a list, see ibid., at 33s-6o. 
'ls Joint Anti-Fasc~t Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 138 (1951). 
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bona fide organizations; and the Attorney General is not immune from 
suit when he exceeds his powers. 
The decision was five to three, Justice Clark not participating. There 
are five majority opinions, only Justice Douglas concurring with Justice 
Burton, and Douglas :filed a. separate opinion as well. The four opinions 
other than Burton's are based on so much broader grounds that they must 
be considered separately. 
The Frankfurter opinion most closely holds the common ground of the 
other four majority Justices. Mter extended consideration of the issue of 
justiciability, he reaches the question of whether the list itself violates due 
process, quite apart from any showing which the Attorney General may 
make in response to this complaint. He concludes that it does. "[D ]esigna-
tion has been made without notice, without disclosure of any reasons jus-
tifying it, without opportunity to meet the undisclosed evidence or sus-
picion on which designation may have been based, and ~thout oppor-
tunity to establish affirmatively that the aims and acts of the organization 
are innocent."'39 Mter elaborate consideration of the requirements of pro-
cedural due process in this situation, he finds "the wholly summary proc-
ess for the organizations is inadequate."•4o 
By different roads, the other three majority Justices reach this same 
result. Indeed, it must be emphasized that the Frankfurter position is the 
minimal ground held by the·others. The Black and Douglas opinions 
would not rest the liberty of thought and views involved on a merely pro-
cedural ground, and particularly on so narrow a base as want of notice and 
hearing. In the Black view, while the entire procedure is illegal on First 
Amendment grounds, if this hurdle is overcome, the employees are still 
entitled to jury trial!4I The holding thus becomes (a) four Justices for the 
proposition that the very existence and publication of the Attorney Gen-
eral's list is a denial of procedural due process; (b) one Justice for the 
proposition that the Attorney General must justify his list in open court; 
and (c) three Justices <;lissent on the pleading point and, more important, 
IJ9lbid., at 161. 
14° Ibid., at 173. 
141 Justice Jackson believes that hearings on the making up of the list must be allowed, not 
for the sake of the organizations which by themselves might not be heard to complain, but 
because the list is used in loyalty cases against government employees, who never have an 
opportunity to challenge it. Justice Black believes that even with hearings, the publication of 
the list would be "a most evil type of censorship," ibid., at 143; and Justice Douglas believes 
that the whole "loyalty system" of which these lists are a part is unconstitutional, ibid., at 
18o-8I. 
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declare that the organizations have no rights of due process as to the list.1 42 
The dissent, by Justice Reed for the Chief Justice and Justice Minton, 
argues that while the list harms the "prestige, reputation, and earning 
power" of the organizations, it "does not prohibit any business of the or-
ganizations, subject them to any punishment or deprive them of liberty of 
speech or other freedom." "The petitioners are not ordered to do anything 
and are not punished for anything."143 Therefore any judicial inspection of 
the list interferes with executive prerogative. 
The Attorney General's List case must be considered in conjunction 
with Bailey 'iJ. Richardson,X44 in which the validity of the entire loyalty pro-
gram for federal government employees was challenged, basically on due 
process and :first amendment grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia had, two to one, upheld the validity of that program. 
With Justice Clark not participating, the holding below was affirmed by 
an equally divided Court, "without opinion." 
One may put "without opinion" in quotation marks because never have 
secret ballots been more clearly cast into a gold :fish bowl for all to see. Six 
of the Justices, precluded from expressing their opinion on the loyalty pro-
gram in the Bailey case by the tradition against :filing opinions where the 
Court is equally divided, expressed themselves on the Bailey case in the 
Attorney General's list case. It becomes perfectly obvious that the divi-
sion on the loyalty program was Justices Reed, Burton, Minton, and the 
Chief Justice to affirm the Court of Appeals, and Justices Black, Frank-
'42 As to the meaning of the decision, particularly in view of the split among the majority• 
there is a great divergence. McCarran, The Supreme Court and the Loyalty Program: The 
Effect of Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 37 A.B.A.J. 434 (I95I), would reduce the majority 
ruling to a pleading conclusion only, readily rebutted by evidence at trial, and he repels the 
suggestion that "the President should drastically amend his Executive Order." Mr. Richard-
son, former chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, construes the opinion as meaning that 
"suitable preliminary hearings should be granted" to organizations. Richardson, The Federal 
Employee Loyalty Program, 5I Col. L. Rev. 546 (r95r). See the review of Richardson's work 
at p. 402 infra. 
More authoritative is the opinion of the Second Circuit on the issue of whether, in a perjury 
case, the government may suggest defendant's membership in the Communist Party by refer-
ring to the Attorney General's list. The Court said, citing the instant case: "The list is a purely 
hearsay declaration by the Attorney General and could have no probative value in the trial of 
this defendant. It has no competency to prove the subversive character of the listed associa-
tions and, failing that, it could have no conceivable tendency to prove the defendant's alleged 
perjury even if it were shown that he belonged to some or all of the organizations listed." 
United States v. Remington, rgr F. 2d 246, 252 (C.A. 2d, I95I). 
On the other hand, subsequent to the decision the American Federation of Radio Artists 
adopted an amendment to its constitution barring persons affiliated with organizations on the 
list from membership. Red-Proof Radio, Business Week 40 (Aug. 25, I95I). 
'4J Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 34I U.S. r23, 202-203 (rg5r). 
'44 34I U.S. gr8 (I95I), lower court opinion r82 F. 2d 46 (App. D.C., 1950). 
HeinOnline  -- 19 U. Chi. L. Rev.  198 1951-1952
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. rg 
furter, Douglas, and Jackson to reverse. Justice Reed tied several pages of 
expression of approval of the loyalty program to the three-Justice dissent 
in the list case, while Justices Black, Douglas, and Jackson very explicitly 
showed their disapproval of the Bailey affirmance.14s Thus there could be 
doubt only as to the positions of Justices Frankfurter and Burton, but the 
tone of their respective opinions makes fairly clear that their stands were 
as stated.1 46 The Douglas opinion in the list case is the most elaborate dis-
sent to the affirmance of the loyalty program, and reduces to a few concise 
pages the constitutional vices of a program which would have been held 
unconstitutional by the switch of one vote on the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals. 
There were other free speech cases, of which only one can be discussed 
in the te:x:U47 In Feiner v. New York/-48 the Court returned to the question 
of the power of a state to suppress speech where the speech itself is legal, 
but provokes a disorderly response. Two years ago, that question had 
come up in connection with Father Terminiello, whose rabble rousing had 
caused him to be found guilty by a Chicago jury under a charge from the 
bench which declared to be illegal conduct that which "stirs the public to 
anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a dis-
turbance." The Court, through Justice Douglas, had held that the prin-
ciples of free speech precluded conviction on the ground that speech not 
itself illegal "invites dispute" by others. Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and 
•4s Reed: Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 206-213 (1951); 
Black: ibid., at 143-44; Douglas: ibid., at 179-83; Jackson, ibid., at 185. 
q6 Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of Loyalty Order procedure, says: "Whether such pro-
cedure sufficiently protects the rights of the employee is a different story." Ibid., at 173. The 
factors which lead him to his result as to the list would very probably give the same result on 
the Loyalty Order itself. 
•47 Not discussed in the text are Nietmokov. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), a routine case 
on refusals to issue a license to Jehovah's Witnesses to use a park; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 
290 (1951), another routine case, this time on street licensing of an offensive speaker where the 
city licensing system sets no standards; and Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). In the 
Breard case, the issue is the validity of one of the so-called Green River ordinances forbidding 
solicitors to approach homes unless invited. The defendant was a magazine salesman. In up-
holding the ordinance, the Court distinguished Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), 
which had invalidated a restriction on the distribution of religious literature door to door, but 
which had carefully reserved the problems of "commercial" activity. Chief Justice Vinson 
dissented on commerce clause grounds, as did Justice Douglas; and Justices Black and Doug-
las dissented on the ground that the decision overruled Martin v. Struthers and other cases. 
The highly commercial activity involved here is so different from that of Martin v. Struthers 
that it is difficult to see any necessary inconsistency between that case and Breard. However, 
Justices Black and Douglas emphasize that "(t]he constitutional sanctuary for the press must 
necessarily include liberty to publish and circulate. In view of our economic system, it must also 
include freedom to solicit paying subscribers." Breard v. Alexandria, supra, at 650. 
•48 340 u.s. 315 (1951). 
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Jackson dissented on the merits, and Chief Justice Vinson on other 
grounds.149 
The Feiner case put approximately the same question over again. In 
Feiner, the speaker was making a pro-Wallace speech on a street comer in 
Syracuse, New York. The speech was offensive to his audience, and "at 
least one [auditor] threatened violence if the police did not act."xso On the 
other hand, some auditors favored the speaker. The police made no effort, 
of the smallest sort, to control the crowd or to restrain the one onlooker 
who made a threat. Instead they arrested the speaker, who was convicted 
of provoking a breach of the peace. The conviction was upheld by the 
Supreme Court by a majority consisting of the four Terminiello dissenters 
plus Justices Reed and Clark, who was not then on the bench. Justices 
Black, Douglas, and Minton dissented. 
The majority conceded the "possible danger of giving overzealous police 
officials complete discretion to break up otherwise lawful meetings"; but 
this, they said, is different because it is "incitement to riot." How one is to 
know and recognize that fine line where a "speaker passes the bounds of 
argument or persuasion" is not discussed and will give great difficulty/51 
Justice Black, dissenting, feared the creation of a "simple and readily 
available technique by which cities and states can with impunity subject 
all speeches" to censorship. Of course the police can prevent breaches of 
the peace. "But if, in the name of preserving order, they ever can interfere 
with a lawful speaker, they first must make all reasonable efforts to pro-
tect him."•s• Justice Douglas expressed a similar thought: "A speaker may 
not, of course, incite a riot .... But this record shows no such extremes. 
It shows an unsympathetic audience and the threat of one man to haul the 
speaker from the stage. It is against that kind of threat that speakers need 
police protection."•s3 
The Terminiello case was not mentioned by the majority or one dissent, 
and was cited in passing in the other. Its status is doubtful. 
One other acute problem has been presented in connection with the 
large volume of "political cases" now in the courts. That is the problem of 
obtaining counsel for the allegedly disloyal. 
It is now, as I can personally vouch from some observation, almost im-
possible to obtain "respectable counsel" in the political cases. Public opin-
r49 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 3 (1949). 
I50 Feiner v. New York, 340 u.s. 3IS, 317 (I9SI). 
r5r Ibid., at 320, 321. 
152 Ibid., at 323, 329. 
153 Ibid., at 331. 
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ion has risen to such a point that many lawyers believe they will be profes-
sionally ruined if they take such cases, even at fair compensation. The 
number of attorneys like Charles Evans Hughes, who spoke out against 
the tide in the 2o's, or like Wendell Willkie, who on principle represented a 
Communist in the Supreme Court, has been small. There have been some 
exceptions. The Washington law firm of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter made 
the attack on the Loyalty Program in Bailey v. Richardson. Mr. John 
Raeburn Green of St. Louis has filed a petition for rehearing for one de-
fendant in the Dennis case. My colleague, Professor Emerson, is arguing 
one motion in trial court in the now pending second string Communist 
case. There are doubtless a few others as well. 
But these acts have been startlingly rare, and for the most part the 
parties have been compelled to take counsel from among a very small 
group of the bar. At the present time, with trial of the second string Com-
munist case in the immediate future, no full staff has been assembled to 
handle the case despite the fact that District Judge Ryan, seeing the prob-
lem, has made substantial efforts to obtain a panel. 
This problem was peripherally before the Court in two aspects of the 
Dennis case. Counsel for the Communists pleaded that they could find no 
one at the American bar, despite requests made to twenty-four lawyers, to 
handle their case in the Supreme Court.154 They asked for permission to 
employ an English barrister. The Court granted that permission, but re-
fused to postpone the date of argument, which in effect nullified the 
grant.1ss Justice Frankfurter added a note to that order, saying that 
counsel if needed would be appointed, but that those already in the case 
were obviously competent. 
The trial attorneys in the Dennis case were held in contempt by the 
trial court, an order affirmed by a divided Court of Appeals, and the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari, J ust.ices Black and Douglas dissenting from 
the denial!56 While the trial attorneys probably well deserved to be held in 
contempt, Judge Clark in the Second Circuit raised serious questions of 
the legality of the procedure of the trial judge in that respect.'57'Jn any 
154 Their list is undocumented, and may not be wholly bona fide. In some instances, there is 
reason to suppose that they refused to accept ordinary conditions of control by counsel. 
ISS 340 u.s. 887 (1950). 
1s6 Sacher v. United States, 182 F. 2d 416 (C.A. 2d, 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951). 
Certiorari was granted on a petition for rehearing at the beginning of the October 1951 Term, 
20 L.W. 3103 (I95I). 
157 The subject is reviewed in Harper and Haber, Lawyer Troubles in Political Trials, 6o 
Yale L.J. I (1951). 
HeinOnline  -- 19 U. Chi. L. Rev.  201 1951-1952
1952] THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1950-51 201 
case, the contempt order, deserved or not, has intensified the difficulties in 
obtaining counsel in such cases. 
So that these cases might be adequately heard in the Supreme Court, 
the Chicago Bar Association suggested to the American Bar Association 
that it establish a panel of counsel for the Dennis case. The refusal of the 
Supreme Court to extend the time for argument made it impossible to 
carry through this plan. True, the Communists have to some extent put 
themselves into their present position by the tactics of their trial counsel 
in the Dennis case; and they are doubtless maximizing the difficulty of 
~ obtaining counsel for propaganda purposes. But there is enough actual 
difficulty to make something like the Chicago Bar's plan necessary if the 
great tradition of the Bar is to be maintained.1s8 
b) Criminal Procedure 
The difference in interests of the 'I:ruman Court from its predecessor has 
brought a basic change in the nature of the criminal procedure cases before 
it. As was noted last year, most of the "fair trial" cases are now swept 
under the rug of certiorari denied. This year most of the criminal pro-
cedure cases turned on either self-incrimination or the meaning and appli-
cation of the federal Civil Rights Acts.1s9 
The self-incrimination cases make an easy bridge from the political 
cases, because most of the self-incrimination cases involved questions 
about Communist affiliation. In the main decision, Blau (Patricia) v. 
United States,160 the petitioner refused to answer questions before a grand 
jury on her alleged association with the Communist Party. In a few words 
•sB "A second contribution which I think the Bar may make relates to fair administrative 
and legislative hearings for persons under investigation and fair trials for persons accused of 
crimes involving security. The Bar has a notable tradition of willingness to protect the rights 
of the accused. It seems to me that if this tradition is to be meaningful today, it must extend 
to all defendants, including persons accused of such abhorrent crimes as conspiracy to over-
throw the Government by force, espionage, and sabotage. Undoubtedly some uninformed 
persons will always identify the lawyer with his client. But I believe that most Americans 
recognize how important it is to our tradition of fair trial that there be adequate representation 
by competent counsel. 
''Lawyers in the past have risked the obloquy of the uninformed to protect the rights of the 
most degraded. Unless they continue to do so in the future, an important part of our rights 
will be gone." 
Letter, President Truman to Arthur B. Freund, Chairman, Section on Criminal Law, 
Amer. Bar Ass'n, Sept. r, rgsr, as published in N.Y. Times § L, p. ro, col. 2 (Sept. 19, 1951). 
•s9 Cases not in these areas are Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951), 
interpreting Rule 17c of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in respect to subpoenas of confi-
dential documents; and Dowd v. United States ex rei Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951), on the rela-
tion of Indiana post-conviction review procedure and the right of habeas corpus in federal 
court. 
•6• 340 U.S. 159 (1950). 
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Justice Black for the Court held that the questions need not be answered 
since, with the Smith Act on the books, "she reasonably could fear that 
criminal charges might be brought against her if she admitted" the associ-
ation. It was not necessary that the admissions themselves be enough to 
convict her if they would be ·"a link in the chain of evidence needed."'6' 
The Blau case is simple enough; it takes no remote supposing to see a 
link between the testimony sought and the Smith Act. Hoffman v. United 
States,'62 on the other hand, is an extreme development. Hoffman, pos-
sessor of a police record, was called before a federal grand jury investigat-
ing rackets in Philadelphia. He was asked a number of questions, particu-
larly concerning his association with one Weisberg, who was eluding the 
grand jury. Hoffman declined to answer questions (a) as to his present 
occupation; (b) as to when he had last seen Weisberg; (c) as to when he 
had last walked to Weisberg on the phone; and (d) as to whether he knew 
where Weisberg was. The Court held that he need answer none of these 
questions. 
In view of Hoffman's extensive record, it is reasonable to suppose that 
responses as to his present occupation might get him into as much trouble 
with the law as Blau's answers about her politics. Hence Justice Clark for 
the Court readily found that refusal to answer met the test, "from the 
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a 
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be 
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result."'63 
But to find danger of entanglement in the criminal law in the questions 
as to Weisberg's location (as distinguished from some other readily im-
aginable dangers) is far-fetched in the extreme. Hoffman has violated no 
law, no matter what answer he gives to those questions, unless in the 
Court's words he has been "hiding or helping to hide another person of 
questionable repute sought as a witness."'64 In this case there is absolutely 
no reason to suppose that Hoffman was hiding Weisberg except that he 
had known Weisberg for many years and that they were both suspected as 
racketeers. Nothing in the record shows any past close collaboration be-
tween the two. What such a record does suggest is that Hoffman may well 
have some information about Weisberg's location. 
This makes a sharp difference between the Blau and H ojfman cases. In 
161 Ibid., at I6I; and see Blau (Irving) v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (I9SI). For recent 
discussion of the privilege, with full citation to the literature, see Meltzer, Required Records, 
the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, r8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 687 
(I95I). 
162 34! U.S. 479 (I9$I). 163 Ibid., at 486-87. 164 Ibid., at 488. 
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Blau, any answer which gives the government anything worth having 
may involve petitioner under the Smith Act; and it is highly likely from 
all the circumstances that the answer will be incriminatory. The possibil-
ity that Hoffman is hiding his old acquaintance, in view of the number of 
places a person might hide in the United States and in view of the fact 
that the possibility is based solely on long acquaintance and a somewhat 
common interest, seems negligible. 
One trouble with this kind of over-e:Jqlansion of the right against self-
incrimination is that it inevitably leads to technical constructions of the 
right which may reach into the very zone in which it is supposed to be 
effective. This is all too well illustrated in the case of Rogers v. United 
States!65 Rogers, like Blau, was interrogated before the Denver federal 
grand jury on possible Communist associations. Rogers was apparently 
unaware of the privilege against self-incrimination. She did admit having 
been Treasurer of the Denver Communist Party, but refused to identify 
the party to whom she had later turned over the books and records because 
of unwillingness to get another person into trouble. This refusal was not 
based on the privilege. When brought before the district judge, she was 
given one day to consider the matter and then for the :first time retained 
counsel. On the next day she declined to answer not merely this question, 
but any questions on her Communist associations, on the ground of the 
privilege. She seems either to have found out about the privilege from her 
counsel or in open court on the next day from discussion in other related 
cases. The Chief Justice for the Court held that the privilege had been 
waived, that she could not be allowed "to select any stopping place in the 
testimony." Rather, "where criminating facts have been voluntarily re-
vealed, the privilege cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the de-
tails.' '166 
If the opinion had been rested solely on other available grounds, as that 
the identification of the other individual was not incriminatory, the results 
would not be so serious. But this rigid application of the doctrine of waiver 
does, as Justice Black, dissenting, said for Justices Fra~urter and Doug-
las as well, "[create] this dilemma for witnesses: On the one hand, they 
risk imprisonment for contempt by asserting the privilege prematurely; on 
the other, they might lose the privilege if they answer a single question. 
The Court's view makes the protection depend on timing so refined that 
lawyers, let alone laymen, will have difficulty in knowing when to claim 
it."167 
•6s 340 U.S. 367 (rgsr). 166 Ibid., at 37I, 373• ' 67 Ibid., at 378. 
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That is exactly what has happened subsequent to the opinion. Several 
persons interrogated by the federal district court in New York concerning 
their relations with a certain Communist-favoring bail fund have had to 
face the alternative of contempt or waiver. They have chosen contempt, 
apparently on the theory that they would prefer the probably lighter 
penalty for contempt to possible conviction under the Smith Act. One has 
already been held in contempt twice, for refusing to answer seemingly in-
nocuous questions about the fund. When interrogated for purposes of this 
article, his counsel explained with apparent sincerity that the waiver 
hazard was too great.168 
The basic result of this year's self-incrimination cases seems to be re-
affirmation of the familiar principle that one may refuse to answer direct 
questions which might implicate hi.J.:h under the law even though that 
prospect, as in the H o.ffman case, is extremely remote. Yet if the questions 
start from a point sufficiently collateral to the main issue, the witness may 
be caught in the waiver-contempt dilemma. The possibility that many 
persons will lose the privilege by waiver, as did Rogers, through sheer 
ignorance of its existence is greatly lessened by the wide-spread publicity 
given the Senate Crime Committee, whose televised hearings during the 
year just passed have made the privilege familiar to millions, and have 
caused it to be claimed more widely than ever before. 
There remain the cases under the federal Civil Rights Acts of 187o and 
1871.169 Of this group, only Williams v. United Statesz?o directly involves 
criminal procedure; but Collins v. Hardyman1 71 and Tenney v. Brandhove172 
involve such similar issues that all may be considered together. 
There were three Jay G. Williams cases in Court this year, all arising 
from one basic fact situation. A Miami, F1orida, lumber company suffering 
from thefts employed a detective agency headed by Williams to find the 
thieves. Williams was also a "special police officer" in Miami. He, two of 
his employees, and one regular policeman seized a number of persons, and, 
using the most savage brutality, including beatings with rubber hose, sash 
cords, pistols and clubs, obtained "confessions." 
Williams and his associates were indicted under Sections 241 and 242 of 
Title 18 of the United States Code. (1) He was convicted, though his as-
sociates were not, under Section 242. The trial court declared a mistrial 
under Section 241. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Wil-
168 As this article is written, these cases are pending in the Second Circuit. 
16~ 16 Stat. 141 (187o), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (195o); 17 Stat. 13 (1871), as amend-
ed, 8 U.S.C.A. § 43 (1942). 
17° See notes 173-7s infra. I7I 341 U.S. 651 (1951). 1' 2 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
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Iiams under Section 242 in this group of cases.173 (2) On retrial, all four 
were convicted under 241. This the Supreme Court reversed.174 (3) For 
their conduct in the cases just mentioned, Williams and the others were 
convicted of perjury.175 This was affirmed. The :first two c~ses will be re-
ferred to here as the 242 case and the 241 case, respectively. 
A. The 242 case. This section provides: "Whoever, under color of any 
law, statute, ordinance ... willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any inhabitant of any State ... to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities" shall be :fined or imprisoned.176 It was this provision 
which had been interpreted in Screws v. United States,I71 in which Sheriff 
Screws had been given a new trial on the issue of intent when charged 
with similar conduct. Justice Douglas, who had written the main opinion 
in the Screws case, spoke for the majority in this case and added much 
helpful clarity to the earlier decision. He held :first, following Screws 
closely, that Williams had acted "under color of law," rather than as a 
private person, in that he had at least "a semblance of policeman's power 
from Florida."1 78 
This set the stage for the main issue, also raised in Screws, whether the 
statute is void for indefiniteness because a policeman cannot be expected 
to know what anything so obscure as "rights, privileges or immunities" 
are. Indeed, the Court has trouble itself in making up its mind. Douglas' 
rejoinder is a triumph of common sense: The words are uncertain, and 
some day the Court may be faced with a marginal situation in which a 
policeman might have trouble in making up his mind. In that case, the law 
may be inapplicable because of its indefiniteness. But in this case, no 
policeman could conceivably have any doubts. 
The major new contribution of the Williams case is its quotation with 
approval of the charge of the trial ju_dge on the issue of intent. The Screws 
case stirred the fear that an impossible standard of intent was being re-
quired by the Court. In this case the trial judge used a good, simple charge 
which makes intent ascertainable largely from objective acts and leaves 
the statute thoroughly workable.1 79 Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and 
Minton dissented, adhering to the Screws case dissent, and Justice Black 
also dissented. 
173 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951). 
174 United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951). 
175 United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951). 
1 76 62 Stat. 696 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (1950). 
177 325 u.s. 91 (1945). 
178 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951). 179 Ibid., at 102. 
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B. The 241 case. The dissenters in the previous case added the Chief 
Justice to their number in this case and thus became a majority. Section 
241 differs from 242 in these principal respects: 241 is directed at con-
spiracy, 242 at the substantive act; and 241 covers injury to citizens in 
"any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States," without reference to "color of law,"180 while 242 refers to 
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution 
or laws of the United States," which are invaded "under color of law." 
Analysis of the sections just quoted shows that they are virtually identi-
cal. Justice Frankfurter found, however, that they mean quite different 
things. 241, he said, in part because it does not have the "color of law" 
limitation, is, oddly enough, to be given a narrower construction than the 
clause which does have the limitation. It is to be construed as applying 
only to invasions of that small category of rights which the federal govern-
ment can reach even if they are not invasions "under color of law." That 
is to say, 241 applies only to (a) invasions by private individuals, not state 
officers acting under color of law, of (b) those rights which are peculiarly 
federal such as, principally, the right to vote. 
Although the Frankfurter opinion is the prevailing opinion, it can not 
be called the majority opinion; it represents the views of four Justices, and 
so does that of Justice Douglas, which is in :flat disagreement. The case is 
thus controlled by the vote of Justice Black, who concurred with the 
Frankfurter result on wholly independent and unrelated grounds.181 On 
the interpretation of Section 241, therefore, the Court is evenly divided; 
and the weight of reason and of history seems overwhelmingly with Doug-
las. The absence of the "color of law" restriction in Section 241 should 
make it obvious that its coverage was intended to be slightly broader, 
rather than narrower, than its companion. It would have been an amazing-
ly bizarre drafting device to limit a statute by deleting its words of restric-
tion. 
Collins v. Hardyman arose from the Civil Rights ;Act of 1871, the Ku 
Klux Act, passed to restrain the activities of that and similar groups dur-
ing Reconstruction. 182 The core of the provision establishes a remedy in 
damages for any party injured by any group of persons who, inter alia, 
180 16 Stat. 141 (187o), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 47(3) (1942). 
xSt Black thought the case governed by res judicata. 
18
' 341 U.S. 651 (1951). Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) also -arose under the 
1871 Act. In that case, Brandhove sued Tenney for damages on the ground that Tenney and 
his associate members of the California legislature's Un-American Committee had conspired to 
violate Brandhove's rights. The Court avoided the kind of issues discussed in the text by the 
holding, in this case, that the statute was inapplicable to acts of state legislators. 
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conspire to "go ... on the premises of another" for the purpose of depriv-
ing their victims of "equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and 
immunities under the laws. "183 In this case a group of Legionaires allegedly 
broke up a meeting in California of persons gathered together for the pur-
pose of discussing national issues and of petitioning Congress for a redress 
of grievances. The plaintiffs were those in attendance at the meeting, the 
defendants were those who allegedly broke it up. The issue was whether 
the complaint stated a cause of action. 
To avoid what it regarded as serious constitutional issues, the majority 
through Justice Jackson, gave an extremely rigid construction of the Act. 
He declared that the defendants, while they had unquestionably invaded 
rights of the plaintiffs, had not deprived them of "equal protection" or of 
"equal privileges and immunities," since their rights under the laws of 
California remained quite unaffected by the invasion. The plaintiffs are 
put to their rights under the laws of California. 
The decision is influenced by United States v. Harris,ZS4 the Reconstruc-
tion decision holding unconstitutional a similar provision establishing 
criminal penalties for violation by private persons of Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights. To avoid the force of that decision, the plaintiffs had care-
fully claimed a right not under the Fourteenth Amendment but under the 
First, the right to petition Congress. Justice Burton, dissenting for Jus-
tices Black and Douglas, thought they should have been successful. 
This decision, because of the constitutional reasons given for the narrow 
statutory construction, is another blow at the power of the federal govern-
ment to deal with private invasion of the rights of citizens. The insistence 
on overt "state action" is a renewed affirmation of the powerlessness of the 
federal government to deal directly with, for example, lynching.18s 
What these cases interpretive of Reconstruction legislation have in com-
mon is an emotional and moral sense of judicial opposition to the legisla-
tion of that era. One need not reduce analysis of the judicial process to 
speculations about what the judge had for breakfast to agree with the 
thoroughly familiar maxim that his opinions are largely a product of his 
conditioning. Today's cases may be decided in terms of the symbols ac-
cepted in high school and elementary college work. 
No era is more subject to those symbolic associations than Reconstruc-
183 17 Stat. 13 (1871), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 47(3) (1942). 
• 8• 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
ISs For an analysis of the historical material leading to the conclusion that this view is his-
torically unsound, and that the Harris case was a basic departure from the plan and purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal 
Protection of the Laws," so Col. L. Rev. 131, 162-66 (1950). 
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tion. In the beginning, the radicals wrote the history and deified their 
heroes. The corruption and cheap politics aspects of Reconstruction were 
minimized, and Andrew ] ohnson was made a drunken fool. The counter 
movement, largely under the profound and useful influence of Professor 
Dunning of Columbia, led to the Democratic interpretation of the era 
which is now largely unchallenged. In this view, Sumner and Stevens were 
fanatical tyrants, Johnson was glorified, and the Reconstruction was noth-
ing but a barbecue for carpetbaggers and scalawags. There is also a very 
recent modem revisionist school which finds no necessity to take a par-
tisan viewpoint.'86 This view results in a far more complex picture than the 
others. It concedes that, for example, Sumner may in different aspects of 
his character have been both an egalitarian and a tyrant; that some 
Southerners were trying both to salvage what they could of the slavery 
system and to protect themselves and their families from outrageous ex-
ploitation of thieves and fools. To give another example of the revisionist 
approach, it is possible that the hated scalawags, or Southern post-war 
"Collaborationists" were not entirely aspiring job holders without prin-
ciple, but in some instances were the earnest remnant of the Whig 
party.r87 
Objective interpretation of Reconstruction legislation requires some 
detachment from the legendary heroes or devils of the era. But as these 
cases show, revisionism as a school of historical thought has not yet 
reached the Supreme Court, and the job of interpreting the laws is ap-
proached in that corruption of the Dunning tradition to which most 
Americans of middle age are educated. Justice Frankfurter in the Williams 
group begins his interpretation with general criticism of Reconstruction 
legislation: The time was "not conducive to the enactment of carefully 
considered and coherent legislation. Strong post-war feeling caused inade-
quate deliberation and led to loose and careless phrasing of laws relating to 
the new political issues."'88 Justice Jackson in the Collins case is more de-
tailed: "The Act was among the last of the reconstruction legislation to be 
based on the 'conquered province' theory which prevailed in Congress for 
a period following the Civil War." It "was passed by a partisan V<?te in a 
highly inflamed atmosphere. It was preceded by spirited debate which 
pointed out its grave character and susceptibility to abuse, and its defects 
186 On the comparison of the revisionist view with others, see Hesseltine, A Quarter Century, 
etc., 25 J. Negro Hist. 440, 445-48 (rg4o); Williams, An Analysis of Some Reconstruction 
Attitudes, I2 J. South. Hist. 469 (r946). 
187 See, e_.g., Donald, The Scalawags in Mississippi Reconstruction, ro J. South. Hist. 447 
(I944). 
188 United States v. Williams, 34I U.S. 70, 74 (r95r). 
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were soon realized when its execution brought about a severe reaction." 
(The sole citation given to reflect the Justice's source of information on 
the "background of this Act, the nature of the debates which preceded its 
passage, and the reaction it produced" is Bowers, The Tragic Era ( 1929), 
as grossly partisan a work as there is on the subject.) The Court of the 
7o's, which virtually emasculated the Fourteenth Amendment, is then 
praised, its members "all indoctrinated in the cause which produced the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but convinced that it was not to be used to cen-
tralize power so as to upset the federal system. "189 
My point is this: If the Court approached the Reconstruction legisla-
tion, not in the spirit of opposition to the enormities of a band of venomous 
madmen, but in that spirit of objectivity which guides its approach to, for 
example, the federal rules, these extremely limiting interpretations would 
not result. This opposition spirit is doubly unsound. It precludes an objec-
tive twentieth-century assessment of the social desirability of some parts 
of this legislation, and prevents a sifting and winnowing of that which 
might, for our time, be good, from that which is bad. It is also unsound 
even at the level of technicality. If the Court really supposes, as does Jus-
tice Frankfurter, that this legislation was "inconsidered and incoherent," 
and :filled with "loose and careless phrasing," or that it was, as Justice 
Jackson believed, purely partisan and abusive, then one could not pos-
sibly conclude that it contains the neat, careful, elaborate distinctions 
which these Justices read into it, and that its coverage is so pin-point 
small. The Justices insist on having it both ways: this was simultaneously 
shotgun legislation and the finest legal lace work on the books. 
SUMMARY OF CIVIL RIGHTS POSITIONS 
A summary of the positions of the Justices in the divided civil rights 
cases follows. As always, such data must be read with the greatest care, for 
they may be misleading. Comparisons with previous years must make 
some incalculable allowance for the fact that the departure of Justices 
Murphy and Rutledge from the bench during the period for which these 
:figures are compiled broke up the group of four which previously had been 
able to grant certiorari in many civil rights cases. Denials of certiorari 
undoubtedly kept some potential cases out of the table which might more 
fully have highlighted divergences of view between Justices Black and 
Douglas and some of their colleagues. 
When all the necessary qualifications are made, this table nonetheless 
has substantial residual value. If a given Justice's decisions put him pre-
,89 Collins v. Hardyman, 34I U.S. 6si, 656-58 (I9SI). · 
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ponderantly in one column or the other, then the :figures contain a clue or 
hint as to his basic attitudes about civil rights. 
There were sixteen divided civil rights cases at the 1950 term.190 Dis-
qualifications result in some Justices having less than this number. 
The same data for the 1949 and 1950 terms only, presented separately 
to make clearer the relationship of Justices Clark and Minton to the rest 
of the Court, are shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 1 
DISTRffiUTION OF VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS CIVIL 
RIGHTS CASES, 1946-1950 
IN SuPPORT OP CLAII.IED RlGRT IN DENIAL OP CLAII.IED RIGRT 
1946- 1946- Per Cent 1946- 1946-
19SO 49 so of Total 19SO 49 so 
Vinson ........ 3 IO 13 rs% I2 62 74 
Black ......... 13 53 66 76 3 r8 2I 
Reed .......... 4 IO 14 r6 I2 62 74 
Frankfurter .... 9 34 43 49 7 38 45 
Douglas ....... 14 49 63 84 2 IO I2 
Jackson ........ 3 20 23 27 I3 so 63 
Burton ........ 7 I3 20 23 9 59 68 
Clark .......... 3 I .4 22 7 7 14 
Minton ........ 2 3 5 r6 14 I2 26 
TABLE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS CIVIL 
RIGHTS CASES, 194!)-1950 
IN SuPPORT OP IN DENIAL 01' 
CLA11o!ED RlGRT CLAIIo!ED RlGRT 
Per Cent Per Cent 
1949-50 of Total 1949-50 of Total 
Vinson ......... 5 17% 25 83% 
Black .......... 27 87 4 I3 
Reed ........... 6 19 25 8r 
Frankfurter ..... 20 6s II 35 
Douglas ........ r6 89 2 II 
Jackson ......... 9 29 22 7I 
Burton ......... IO 32 22 68 
Clark ........... 4 22 14 78 












"3° The divided civil rights cases were: Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (195o); 
Blau (Irving) v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); 
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); 
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Gamer v. Bd. Public Welfare, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); 
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 
340 U.S. 290 (1951); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Tenney v. Brandhove, 
341 u.s. 367 (1951); United States v. Williams, 341 u.s. sS (1951); United States v. Williams, 
341 U.S. 70 (1951); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951). Chief Justice Vinson is 
treated as not participating in the Breard case for purposes of this table since his vote is cast 
upon a point distinct from the civil rights issue which concerned the other eight Justices. 
Unanimous civil rights cases, not included in the table, are Blau (Patricia) v. United 
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IV. LAWYERS' LAW 
a) Federal jurisdicti01t, procedure, and related subjects 
For intriguing technical questions, the 1950 term was a lawyer's feast, 
with at least eight cases of distinct interest.I91 Major problems were raised 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.1 9• In one, the issue was whether the 
government could be impleaded by a defendant as a joint tort-feasor under 
the Act, and the Court held that it could.193 In the second, the Court 
unanimously decided that the government could not be sued for injuries 
borne by soldiers incident to military service.194 
The military liability case involved three different situations. In one, 
the deceased allegedly burned to death as a result of negligent quartering. 
In a second, deceased allegedly died because of an army doctor's mal-
States, 340 U.S. IS9 (19so); Dowd v. United States ex rel Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (I9SI); Gerende 
v. Bd. Supervisors, 341 u.s. s6 (19S1); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 u.s. !28 (I9SO); Niemotko v. 
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (19s1); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. so (r9sr). 
The table in the 1949 Term article, 37-38, contained an error in the list of cases, called to 
my attention by Mr. Irving Dilliard of the St. Louis Post Dispatch. In note 142, Building 
Service Union v. Ga2zam, 339 U.S. S32 (19SO), was erroneously listed as nonunanimous, 
and Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (19so), which was a nonunanimous civil rights case, was 
omitted. However, this error occurred in the footnote only, and not in the Table, so that the 
figures given remain unchanged. 
19 1 Not othernise mentioned in the text are Amer. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 
(19sr), on the removability of a suit against local and foreign defendants under the provision 
of 28 U.S.C.A. § r441(c) (19so) for removal of a "separate or independent claim or cause of 
action." In this case the original claim was made in a state court against a local defendant, the 
insurance agent, and two foreign insurance companies. One of the insurance companies re-
moved, and judgment was obtained only against it. It was nonetheless allowed subsequently 
to rai!ie the issue of the legality of the removal precipitated by itself, and to defeat the removal 
becausetheclaim againstithad not been "separateorindependent."Snyderv.Buck,340 U.S. rs 
(r9so) holds that where an action is against a named government official who retires during its 
pendency, his successor must be substituted within the statutory time or the action abates. 
(In the Finn case, Justice Douglas, dissenting, expressed the view that petitioner, having re-
moved his case and lost it, "is now estopped from having it remanded." Amer. Fire & Casualty 
Co. v. Finn, supra, at 19. In the Snyder case, Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the Court. 
There the government lost in the trial court, and it wrongfully took the appeal in the name of 
respondent who had retired. Nonetheless, here, said Justice Douglas, is a "declared policy of 
Congress not to be altered by ... some theory of estoppel." Snyder v. Buck, supra, at 19. 
If estoppel can keep a defendant from benefiting from his own jurisdictional error under one 
section of the judicial code, why not another?) 
In Missouri ex rel Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. r (19so), it was held that a state 
may apply its own forum non conveniens doctrine to bar a Federal Employers Liability Act 
case from its courts. In United States ex rel Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (19S1), the Court 
held that only the Attorney General, and not a subordinate, may be directed by a court to 
produce papers of the Department in court. As a practical matter, this requires that such suits 
be brought in the District of Columbia, and renders immeasurably more difficult the requiring 
of papers in criminal litigation. What good is served by this awkwardness is not disclosed. 
1 92 6o Stat. 812, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (r9so). 
193 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. S43 (19S1). 
194 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 13S (19so). 
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practice. In a third, the plaintiff claimed that a towel had negligently been 
left in his abdomen by an army doctor. Justice Jad·son, in an admirable 
and thoughtful opinion, held the Act inapplicable. He readily distin-
guished Brooks v. United States,195 which had permitted recovery for a 
soldier injured by government negligence while on furlough-in that situa-
tion, the soldier stands in the same position as the remainder of the public. 
But the soldier on duty is protected by a cordon of federal regulations and 
laws quite outside the Tort Claims Act, arid. there is no apparent great 
utility in pulling them under that statute. 
Of major importance in the field of review of state administrative regu-
lation is Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co.1 96 The suit 
was a diversity action brought in federal court to enjoin the operation of a 
Commission order concerning termination of service on particular lines. 
The jurisdictional issue was whether such a suit can be brought in federal 
court. 
Eight years ago, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,t91 the Court had, five to four, 
held that a somewhat similar suit to enjoin an order of the Texas Railroad 
Commission could be brought only in a state court. The Burford case was 
open to either of two interpretations: either it was a comprehensive deci-
sion as to state administrative agencies generally, or it was a very special-
ized situation peculiar to the Texas oil problem and to the unusual agency-
court relationship in Texas oil law. In this year's Southern Ry. case, seven 
Justices agreed, in an opinion by the Chief Justice, to push Burford to its 
maximum interpretation, and the present suit was ordered dismissed from 
federal court on its authority. The point here, as in Burford, was not one 
of jurisdictional power; it was whether, as a matter of equitable discretion, 
a federal court ought to decline to exercise jurisdiction in these adminis-
trative agency cases. 
Surely if the federal courts have an equitable discretion, they should 
exercise it here. ~very federal issue c~ be raised in the Supreme Court no 
matter which route the case follows, and all the considerations of avoid-
ance of needless tension in federal-state relations apply in state adminis-
trative order cases generally.198 The opinion of the Chief Justice marshals 
many reasons for its result. All this being true, the only real puzzle in 
the case is the vigor of Justice Frankfurter's argument in disagreement, 
i 9s 337 U.S. 49 (1949). '96 341 U.S. 341 (1951). ' 97 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
>98 The cases are comprehensively reviewed in the Burford opinion; and see Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943). For fuxther discussion see Contraction 
of Federal Jurisdiction, p. 361 infra. 
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in which Justice Jackson joined, that the holding is "in flagrant contra-
diction with the unbroken course of decisions in this Court for seventy-
five years."'99 The ruling, on the contrary, seems to be the inevitable de-
velopment of a path which Justice Frankfurter himself helped to map.""0 
It is a prerogative of the critic to be perverse, and as a result, Justice 
Frankfurter can be belabored for excess of caution in the case just men-
tioned, and for excess of innovation in the most novel jurisdictional case of 
the year, West Virginia v. Sims.201 This is the West Virginia compact case. 
Eight states entered into a compact concerning pollution of the Ohio. 
Congress approved the compact. Subsequently, in an action in state court 
appropriately raising the issue, the West Virginia Supreme Court found its 
own state's act ratifying the compact invalid under the state constitution, 
principally on the ground that it violated Art. X, Section 4, limiting the 
capacity of the state to contract debts. 
The Supreme Court reversed this opinion of the West Virginia Supreme 
Court in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter which substitutes the Supreme 
Court's own interpretation of Art. X, Section 4, for that of the West Vir-
ginia Court. The Supreme Court's opinion concludes: "In view of these 
provisions, we conclude that the obligation of the State under the Com-
pact is not in conflict with Art. X, sec. 4 of the State Constitution.""02 
The Court, in three opinions, offers three possible grounds for reversing 
West Virginia. The first is Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion, that the 
Court has the power to reinterpret state holdings on its own constitution 
in the peculiar area of the compact clause, despite the fact that for vir-
tually all other purposes, the state is the final authority on its own law. 
The second ground·is that of Justice Reed, who flatly disagrees that the 
Supreme Court may interpret the state constitution for itself "unless it is 
prepared to say that the interpretation is a palpable evasion to avoid a 
federal rule."203 He seems (for his opinion is not extensive) to accept the 
argument of the United States, on the side of the petitioner, that the Com-
pact Clause "must be read as an affirmative grant of power to States to 
enter into interstate compacts, subject only to the necessity of obtaining 
the consent of Congress; that this provision of the Federal constitution 
necessarily takes precedence over all State statutes and constitutions; and 
199 Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 362 (1951). 
200 R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); and see particularly R.R. Comm'n 
of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940), opinion modified, 3II U.S. 614 
(1940). 
201341 U.S. 22 (1951). 202 Ibid., at 32. 203 Ibid., at 33· 
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that any attempt by a State, by its Constitution or otherwise, to impose 
further limitations on its power to enter into such compacts must fail be-
cause of conflict with the Constitution of the United States."•"4 As Justice 
Reed himself puts it: "Since the Constitution provided the compact for 
adjusting interstate relations, compacts may be enforced despite other-
wise valid state restrictions on state action."•os 
Finally there is Justice Jackson's solution. This compact was ratified by 
West Virginia in 1939, by Congress in 1940. This suit involves West Vir-
ginia appropriations for a period ten years later, 1949-50. Justice Jackson 
sees this as a case of estoppel. "Whatever she now says her Constitution 
means, she may not apply retroactively that interpretation to place an 
unforeseeable construction upon what the other States to this Compact 
were entitled to believe was a fully authorized act."2 " 6 Assuming that the 
West Virginia court is to be reversed, Justice Jackson's method is satis-
fying. Granted, as he says, that "[e]stoppel is not often to be invoked 
against the govemment."•"7 It is nonetheless sufficiently shocking to one's 
sense of justice that a state should be able to take itself out of a contract 
with seven other states ten years after the event that the handy elasticity 
of estoppel can well make a convenient bar. 
The Reed approach, making the state constitution irrelevant to the 
issue on the theory of an overriding compact power, has the possible vice 
of proving too much; by this device a state might escape any of its consti-
tutional limitations merely because another state agreed and Congress 
gave consent. But, on the other hand, this may be a completely fanciful 
fear for our actual experience with compacts does not support it!"8 More-
over, it does have the support of Hinderlider v. La Plata Co./"9 which he 
claims for it. In the Hinderlider case, Justice Brandeis overrode an inter-
pretation of Colorado law by the Supreme Court on the ground that there 
are two methods of settling interstate disputes, the judicial and the legis-
lative, and "[t]he compact-the legislative means-adapts to our Union 
of sovereign states the age-old treaty-making power of independent sov-
ereign nations."210 Brandeis seems (for the opinion is somewhat ambigu-
204 Brief for United States, at 20, West Virginia v. Sims, 34r U.S. 22 {rgsr). 
205 West Virginia v. Sims, 34r U.S. 22, 34 {rgsr). 
206 Ibid., at 35· 
2 07 Ibid., at 36. 
20s For an extremely good general article on compacts, with full reference to the literature, 
see Regional Education: A New Use of the Interstate Compact?, 34 Va. L. Rev. 64 {r948), 
which discusses the approximately one hundred compacts since r789. 
209 304 U.S. 92 (r938). 210 Ibid., at ro4. 
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ous) to be developing a theory that judicial interpretation is, as Reed says, 
irrelevant to the establishing of binding compacts, and applies only to 
their interpretation. 
The Frankfurter approach gives a different reading to the Hinderlider 
case. But the clincher for the Reed approach is that Hinderlider at no point 
attempted actually to interpret the Colorado law, as Frankfurter does the 
West Virginia law. Insofar as the Frankfurter opinion departs from the 
customary rule against federal interpretation of a state constitution, it is 
undesirable; for it unnecessarily pits the judgment of the federal as against 
the state judiciary on a point on which the federal judiciary has far less 
competence than that of the state. 
b) Full faith and credit 
Recent divorce decisions have held that where a husband and wife of 
state A go to state B to obtain a divorce, and both are present in person or 
by counsel in state B and have full opportunity to raise the issue of the 
jurisdiction of state B's courts there, neither will be permitted to raise the 
issue of B's jurisdiction in subsequent litigation in state A.m But the 
question of the rights of third parties to make that challenge had not been 
closed. 
The difficulties arise because the holding that both parties are bound if 
they appear is based on res judicata. But res judicata is not, strictly speak-
ing, available as a bar to a person, as a child, who was not a party to state 
B's divorce. The issue is raised under the most extreme conditions in this 
year's Johnson v. Muelberger,212 in which a child of a .first marriage chal-
lenged her father's divorce from a second marriage in a dispute over the 
father's estate with the wife of his third marriage. The divorce from wife 
No.2 is thus both challenged and upheld by persons who were not parties 
to it. 
The challenged divorce took place in Florida. This action between child 
of wife No. r, and wife No.3, took place in New York. The Florida juris-
diction for the challenged divorce was in fact spurious. New York held 
that its courts could review the validity of the Florida divorce. Justice 
Reed for the Supreme Court reversed, and rounded out the recent develop-
ments in this branch of the law with this corollary: The right of the state 
of the forum to permit a collateral attack upon a divorce depends, not 
upon its own law of collateral attack, but upon that of the divorcing state. 
211 The most recent case is Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), discussed by many, 
including Paulsen, Migratory Divorce, 24 Ind. L.J. 25 (1948). 
212 340 u.s. 581 (1951). 
HeinOnline  -- 19 U. Chi. L. Rev.  216 1951-1952
2!6 THE UNIVERSITY OF CffiCAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. I9 
In this situation, if Florida would have permitted the child to raise the 
issue of the validity of the Florida divorce, then New York should do so. 
Otherwise New York may not do so. Upon examination of the (very 
skimpy) Florida law on the subject, it was held that Florida would not 
have permitted the attack. 
The case is completely consistent with the policy of the recent divorce 
cases, notably Sherrer v. Sherrer.2 ' 3 If the parties to a marriage are to be 
allowed, as Sherrer does allow them, to get a divorce from any state that 
will not inquire too scrupulously into its jurisdiction, there is very little 
reason to allow a child to unsettle the situation. As Professor Paulsen, a 
close student of the subject, says, "it is difficult to see why a child should 
be permitted to raise doubts, in a collateral proceeding, about the validity 
of his parents' divorce."~'4 The "quickie" divorce states can now, if need 
be, patch up their own law of collateral attack, and thus render their six 
week residence requirements immune from attack. The evils of divorce by 
consent would not be appreciably rectified by leaving a loophole in the 
law. 
V. THE INSTITUTION AND ITS jUSTICES 
THE WORK OF THE INSTITUTION 
Again this year, the most striking aspect of the work of the Court was 
its declining quantity. This year the number of cases was 88.2's For the 
immediately preceding years, the number has been: r949-94; r948-r22; 
I947-rr9. Before World War II, the docket usually ran to 200 and more 
cases a year. 
This reduction in the size of the docket is due to two major factors. 
First is the rigidity with which the writ of certiorari is being granted. 
Second is the decline in cases worthy of consideration. If certiorari were 
granted in all the cases in which it might rationally be granted, the num-
213 334 u.s. 343 (r948). 
214 Paulsen, Divorce Jurisdiction by Consent of the Parties, 26 Ind. L.J. 38o, 383 (rgsr). 
215 The same method of counting cases has been used uniformly throughout this series of 
articles. Counted are those cases which were (a) argued, and (b) decided with an opinion 
which is more than a single word of affirmance or reversal with citations. For example, Crest 
Specialty v. Trager, 34I U.S. gr2 (rgsr), is not counted because, although it was argued, the 
order of disposition consists entirely of, "Per curiam: The judgment is reversed. Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. I47·" 
The greatest compilation difficulty arises in connection with companion cases. Simple com-
panion cases are not included. For example, Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Ry: Employees v. Wis. 
Emp. Rei. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (rgsr) and the companion cases of St. John v. Wis. Emp. Rei. 
Bd., 340 U.S. 4rr (rgsr), and Bus Employees v. Wis. Emp. Rei. Bd., 340 U.S. 4r6 (rgsr), are 
treated for all tabular purposes as one case. More complex companion cases, which require 
serious discussion of at least one independent point, are counted separately. 
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ber of cases would still not reach the pre-War docket figures, but the num-
ber would be considerably greater than it now is.2 ' 6 
The fact is, as was noted last year, that three Justices as prolific as 
Hughes, Brandeis or Stone (or Black or Douglas, for that matter) could 
have written all the majority opinions at the past term with no perceptible 
strain. The purpose of the Certiorari Act of 1925217 was to reduce the dock-
et to a manageable level, not to leave the Court with nothing to do. There 
is a Knute Rockne legend that one of his players asked to be excused from 
practice one afternoon because he was to attend a dance in the evening. 
Rockne excused him without comment. When Saturday came, the boy 
was not used, and so again the next Saturday, and the next. Finally he 
asked Rockne when he would play. 
Said Rockne, "I'm saving you." 
"For what?" asked the boy. 
"For the junior prom," was Rockne's answer. 
The same question can be asked here: What is the Court saving itself 
for? 
Professor Harper and his collaborators have set themselves the task of 
discussing the certioraris denied so completely that it is unnecessary to go 
TABLE 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJORITY OPINIONS 
Vinson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Jackson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Black ................. II Burton ................. 8 
Reed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Io Clark. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Frankfurter... . . . . . . . . . 8 Minton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Douglas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I Per curiam . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
into the details here.2 ' 8 However, appended to this article is a list of some 
certioraris which might well have been granted. 
The distribution of majority opinions2 ' 9 among the Justices is shown in 
Table 3· 
The extent to which the views of particular Justices have prevailed can 
best be measured by concentrating on the most important of the decisions, 
216 Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Do in the 1949 Term, 99 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 293 (1950), compile a list of all the cases they think might conceivably have been 
granted at the 1949 term. The list is 65 cases. If all had been granted, the docket would still, 
by pre-World War II standards, have been light. My own list of possible grants last year, less 
comprehensively gathered, was 18 cases. 1949 Term article, 53, 54· 
217 43 Stat. 938 (1925), as amended, 62 Stat. 928 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1254 (1949). 
21s Their article cited in note 216, supra, is to be followed by a series. 
219 This, too, has its complications in the few cases in which there is no opinion of the Court. 
In those instances, the case is listed for the Justice who announced the judgment of the Court. 
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and for this purpose I have chosen, as objectively as possible on so subjec-
tive a matter, the two groups of cases which seem to me to have the most 
important consequences to society. The first group consists of the nine 
cases which seem the most significant of the year.220 The second group of 
eighteen cases are definitely less important, but are not routine.22I The 
data in Tables 4 and 5 are taken from these two groups. Disqualifications 
or, in one case, an opinion dubitante,= give some of the Justices fewer than 
a total of twenty-seven. 
TABLE 4 
VOTING DISTRIBUTION IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES22l 
1\IAJOJUTY VOTES DISSENTING VoTEs 
JUSTICE Major Important Total Major Important Total 
Vinson .......... 7 I6 23 2 2 4 
Black ........... 4 IO I4 5 7 I2 
Reed ............ 8 I4 22 I, 4 5 
Frankfurter ...... 6 9 I7 2 7 9 
Douglas ......... 5 8 I3 4 IO I4 
Jackson .......... 9 IS 24 0 3 3 
Burton .......... 5 I6 2I 4 2 6 
Clark ............ 5 I4 19 I 3 4 
Minton .......... 6 I2 I8 3 3 6 
The foregoing data show, as would be expected with the generally con-
servative trend of the Court, that Justices Black and Douglas are most 
often in the minority in important cases. For the first time in the last five 
=• Blau (Patricia) v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (195o); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 
651 (1951); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (r9sr); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 
(r95r); Garnerv. Bd. Pub. Works,341 U.S. 716 (1951); JointAnti-FascistRefugee Committee 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. II4 (1951); 
RCA v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers, 341 U.S. 
384 (1951) . 
.., AlabamaPublicServiceComm'n v. Southern Ry. Co.,341 U.S.341 (1951) ;Bus Employees 
v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Dean 
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp. 
341 U.S. 558 (1951); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 
340 U.S. 581 (1951); NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 
(1951); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); Norton Co. v. Dep'tRevenue, 
340 U.S. 534 (1951); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n, 
341 U.S. 329 (1951); Rogers v. United S.tates, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 
340 U.S. 231 (1951); Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 6o2 (1951); Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951); Univ. Camera 
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951). Timken 
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) is not included because of the un-
certainty of which majority (i.e. the majority on which point) to use for tabular purposes. 
=Justice Frankfurter, in RCA v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951). 
223 Where a Justice dissents on a minor point only, or concurs on a minor point but dis-
agrees on the main point, his vote is counted on the major issue. Thus the concurring votes of 
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson in Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 
341 U.S. 341 (1951) are treated as a dissent because of their disagreement on the main matter. 
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years, Justice Jackson is the Justice most often in the majority, in part a 
product of the trend toward his views both in the area of restriction of 
freedom of speech and in the area of expansion of the commerce clause as a 
limitation on state power. 
Table 6 shows the distribution of agreements among the Justices in the 
major and important cases. 
TABLE 5 
PERCENTAGE IN MAJORITY, 
MAJOR AND IMPOR-
TANT CASES 
Vinson ................... Ss% 
Black .................... 54 
Reed ..................... S2 
Frankfurter ............... 65 
Douglas .................. 4S 
Jackson ........... , . . . . . . . S9 
Burton ................... 7S 
Clark ..................... S3 
Minton ................... 75 
TABLE 6 
AGREEMENT AMONG JUSTICES IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES 
Frank- Doug- Jack-
Vinson Black Reed furter las son Burton Clark 
Vinson ...... 14 22 13 II 20 19 rS 
Black ....... 14 II 13 19 13 14 12 
Reed ........ 22 II I2 12 21 rS I7 
Frankfurter .. I3 I3 12 II IS I7 IO 
Douglas ..... II I9 12 II I2 13 13 
Jackson ...... 20 I3 2I IS 12 IS I6 
Burton ...... 19 14 IS I7 13 IS I7 
Clark ........ IS 12 I7 IO 13 I6 I7 










Justices most often in agreement were Chief Justice Vinson and Justice 
Reed. Justices least often in agreement were Justices Douglas and Minton. 
THE WORK OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES 
On this bench, which history will record as the Vinson Court, the Chief 
Justice remains a surprisingly obscure figure. On the one hand, for the 
past two years of frequently divided decisions, he has almost invariably 
been of the majority in the important cases. Yet the cases which he assigns 
to himself are frequently modest, and in the remainder one seldom gets the 
sense of a distinct personality. 
During his four years, the Chief Justice has consistently upheld restric-
tions on freedom of speech except in the most obviously precedent-con-
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trolled situations.224 His opinions in the Feiner and Dennis cases are thus 
in his personal tradition. But while the Dennis case has been severely 
criticized in this article for its policy, that criticism should not lap over on 
its technique. Assuming that freedom of speech is to be limited, the Chief 
Justice's is a workman like way of doing it, as clear as a landmark decision 
is likely to be, contemplative, and far more moderate than the excessive 
positions asked by the government and offered by the concurrences of 
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson. The opinion is a thoroughly fair expres-
sion of its point of view. So with his opinion on the Wisconsin public utility 
strike act/25 which is direct, succinct, and comprehensive. 
One trifling embarrassment for the Chief Justice was a per curiam opin-
ion in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks/26 in which he was com-
pelled to swallow some poorly-thought-through prose of a few years be-
fore. Four years ago he wrote an opinion giving the Tillamooks a judg-
ment against the United States for an ancient taking of the Indians' land. 
That judgment, if it rested on anything, necessarily rested on Fifth 
Amendment "just compensation" principles, for the earlier opinion ex-
cluded every possible other basis on which it might have rested.227 This 
year the issue was whether the tribe should have interest on that judg-
ment, to which they were entitled if it was a just compensation award. 
The per curiam, in denying the interest, declared that the previous judg-
ment had not rested on just compensation, and again discreetly avoided 
disclosing what its basis was. 
The Chief Justice must bear responsibility for what is probably the 
most artless opinion to emerge from the Court in some years. The case is 
Jordan v. J?eGeorge,228 and the issue is whether an alien who was twice con-
224 See, e.g., American CommunicationsAss'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); cf. a precedent-
controlled situation, this year's Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), and Kunz v. 
New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 
225 Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951). 
226 341 U.S. 48 (1951). 
227 United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946). The earlier opinion said 
that the jurisdictional act under which the case was brought "neither admitted nor denied 
liability. The Act removes the impediments of sovereign immunity and lapse of time and pro-
vides for judicial determination of the designated claim. No new right or cause of action is 
created. A merely moral claim is not made a legal one. The cases are to be heard on their 
merits and decided according to legal principles .... "Ibid., at 45· Those legal principles, the 
opinion went on, were to be found in such cases as United States v. Creek Nations, 295 U.S. 
103, no (1935). But the Creel{ Nations case, with its allusion to "pertinent constitutional 
provisions" and its other citations shows clearly that if .there was any "legal" and non-moral 
base for the original claim, it must have been the Fifth Amendment. See Cohen, Handbook of 
Indian Law 94, 96 (1945). This year's case thus presents a most mysterious tum-about for 
the Chief Justice and Justices Frankfurter and Douglas, all that is left of the earlier majority. 
228 341 U.S. 223 (1951). 
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victed of liquor tax avoidance had been guilty of "moral turpitude" for 
deportation purposes. The following quotations are here strung together 
from six pages of the opinion: 
Our inquiry in this case is narrowed to determining whether this particular offense 
involves moral turpitude .... Without exception, federal and state courts have held 
that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude. In the construc-
tion of the specific section of the Statute before us, a court of appeals has stated that 
fraud has ordinarily been the test to determine whether crimes not of the gravest 
character involve moral turpitude. In every deportation case where fraud has been 
proved, federal courts have held that the crime in issue involved moral turpitude ... ·• 
In the state courts, crimes involving fraud have universally been held to involve 
moral turpitude .... In view of these decisions, it can be concluded that fraud has 
consistently been regarded as such a contaminating component in any crime that 
American courts have, without exception, included such crimes within the scope of 
moral turpitude. It is therefore clear, under an unbroken course of judicial decisions, 
that the crime of conspiring to defraud the United States is a 'crime involving moral 
turpitude.' ... Whatever else the phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' may mean 
in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an 
ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude .... Fraud is the 
touchstone by which this case should be judged. The phrase 'crime involving moral 
turpitude' has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct. 
One gets the impression that there is some connection between fraud 
and moral turpitude. 
For Justice Black, the term was a consistent series of defeats on every-
thing that is really important to him. No judge in America holds :firmer 
views of constitutional opposition to restrictions on speech. No one is more 
opposed to loyalty programs. The Dennis case/29 the Feiner case,230 the 
Los Angeles Oath case,231 the piddling ground gained against the loyalty 
program in the Joint Anti-Fascist case2 32-these are blows at his most fun-
damental convictions. 
Black's main task of the year was recording that opposition. From the 
structure and brevity of his opinions, it appears that he has given up com-
prehensive in favor of very pointed opposition. "It should be plain that 
my disagreement with the majority of the Court as now constituted stems 
basically from a different concept of the reach of the constitutional liberty 
of the press rather than from any difference of opinion as to what former 
cases have held," he says in Breard v. Alexandriaf33 and in Dennis he adds 
to the same thought: "Consequently, it would serve no useful purpose to 
:129 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
23" 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 232 341 U.S. 123 (:r;951). 
231 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). 2 33 341 U.S. 622, 6so (1951). 
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state my position at length."234 Yet that desire to strike with one blow 
may result in opinions too elliptical; in Dennis, there are only two para-
graphs on the critical issue, and a little more would have been helpful. 
There is a hint of disagreement with the "clear and present danger" ap-
proach without clear suggestion of what should be substituted. 
In other zones, Black's work shows its usual qualities of crisp compe-
tence. Outstanding opinions are the self-incrimination cases, Blau and 
Rogers (dissent) ;23s a war risk insurance case;236 and a full faith and credit 
case involving a Wisconsin action on an Illinois wrongful death statute.237 
On the debit side, the dissent in the Dean Milk case38 in which he would 
uphold the Madison, Wisconsin, prohibition on sales of milk not pas-
teurized in the neighborhood could only have been written by a Justice 
who was very deeply committed to the proposition that state regulations 
of commerce can scarcely ever burden it. 
If there had been any lingering doubts that Justice Reed is still the 
Court's middle-of-the-roader, its "swing man," they were erased by the 
work of the term. It was a successful and productive year for him, one on 
the road to becoming intellectual leader of the new majority. As was pre-
dicted last year, Reed is becoming the Sutherland to Vinson's Taft-i.e., 
the writer of many of the most important and most serious opinions of the 
new Court. In technical zones, he was, happily, called upon with fre-
quency, with such good results as Johnson v. Muelberger,239 the case of the 
"quickie" divorce challenged by a child who was not a party to it; and 
Standard Oil Co. v. New fersey,Z4° an extremely good opinion upholding a 
New Jersey escheat statute. 
In basic matters of social policy, Reed continued to exhibit great cau-
tion. His opinions in the United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.241 and Timken 
Roller Bearing Co. v. United StateSZ42 antitrust cases, the :first refusing fully 
to strengthen the decree and the second striking a body blow to divestiture 
as an antitrust remedy, are typical of his unwillingness to put real bite 
behind the bark of the Sherman Act. In matters of free speech, Reed is the 
234 341 U.S. 4.94, 579 (1951). 
235 Blau (Patricia) v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 
367 (1951). 
236 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54 (1950). 
237Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). 
238 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
239 340 U.S. sSr (r95r). 
240 341 U.S. 428 (1951). 
2 4' 340 U.S. 76 (r95o). 
242 341 U.S. 593 (1951). The Timken case is so much more important than U.S. Gypsum 
that it may be misleading to allude to the two together. 
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hardest-hitting of the opponents of liberalism. His dissent in the Joint 
Anti-Fascistcase43 is one of the most thorough systematizations of reaction 
on the books. It is, given its point'of view, one of the best opinions of the 
year. He faces Justice Burton's pleading points head on. He meets the 
question of right to sue by demonstrations that no rights of the petitioners 
are abridged, contends that no legal injury is done the organizations by 
their listing, and manages to turn the discussion off to the safe ground of 
noninterference with administrative discretion. The listing he analogizes 
to a grand jury investigation: "These petitioners are not ordered to do 
anything and are not punished for anything."244 The argument is mas-
sively (but not excessively) supported with the paraphernalia of the law 
library, the orders, the cases, the statutes, the English materials. Every-
thing is considered, except what the listing actually does. 
The occupational hazard of judging for Justice Frankfurter is making 
up his mind and getting things done.2 45 This is worth comment because it 
is more than one man's psychological quirk; it is symptomatic of the 
plight of the intellectual liberal in our times, torn between opposing abso-
lutes. Frankfurter's Dennis opinion, as was said earlier, is an epitome of 
intellectual ineffectiveness; it is many pages of consent to what the legisla-
ture has done, followed by many pages of regret that they have done it. 
One half or the other of that essay is irrelevant to the judge's function. 
The one thing the public ought to get from its judges is some kind of 
decision, one way or the other. In Canton R. Co. v. Rogan,Z46 Justice Frank-
furter joins Justice Jackson in "reserving judgment"; as far as they are 
concerned, the case is not decided at all. And in RCA v. United States,"41 
the color TV case, the Justice's opinion (neither a concurrence nor a dis-
sent) is "dubitante," and consists of a general, and rather interesting, 
essay on the facts of color television, without any resolution of the issues 
brought to the Court for decision. As one of the Justice's friends is re-
ported to have said to him, "I agree with everything you say, but will 
deny to the death your right to say it." 
2 43 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951). 
2 H Ibid., at 203. 
245 No new development: "Justice Frankfurter considers the actual decision of cases by the 
Supreme Court of less importance than .some other Justices, carrying his doctrine of nonaction 
for that tribunal to the point of systematic philosophy. In a very substantial number of cases, 
he would either not decide the case as a matter of some general policy or remand it for further 
proceedings before he would consider it r,ipe for decision. This year he was either alone or in a 
small minority in seven cases which he thought not suitable for decision." 1948 Term article, 
49· 
246 340 u.s. SII (19SI). 247 341 U.S. 412. (1951). 
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When this inconclusive quality spreads to the whole institution, cases 
are undecided by the Court as a whole. The Justice's opinion in Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB/48 described at length above, is a superb analysis 
of the intent of Congress as to judicial review of administrative orders; but 
just when the inconclusiveness and haziness of the Congressional will is 
laid bare, the whole problem for administrative agencies generally is sent 
back to the lower courts without any concrete leadership as to what they 
are to do. 
There are major Frankfurter credits to be noted. The Universal Camera 
discussion has been mentioned. The dissent in the Schwegmann case249 is 
as good an example as there can be of working out legislative history, and 
acquiescing in it. The Williams case, interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 
I8JI, may be, as was argued above, unsound; but it is an excellent and 
ingenious attempt to make its case.250 The opinion in the case on federal 
court review of state administrative agencies is a concise job of massing all 
the favorable precedents, and distinguishing away those unfavorable.251 
A decision on Missouri's right to dismiss FELA cases on forum non con-
veniens grounds is clear and crisp.252 A concurrence on the right of a dis-
trict court to subpoena Department of Justice records is considerably 
more clear than the opinion of the Court which it accompanies.253 
In terms of personal accomplishment, this is very probably Justice 
Douglas' outstanding year on the Court. In 195o-5I, he was the batter 
who couldn't strike out. His Dennis dissent/54 clear, artful, and strong, will 
stand with the great expressions of Holmes and Brandeis in the free speech 
cases. His majority opinion in the Schwegmann case knocking out state 
fair trade laws as applied to "non-signing" merchants is, at least, a tour de 
force. His opinion in the Joint Anti-Fascist case255 should appeal even to 
those who disagree with it as a powerful statement of the case against the 
loyalty program. His majority opinion in the Williams group256 eliminates 
248 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The principal institutional consequences of this philosophy of in-
decision is probably felt in the certioraris denied; the declining docket may be in part due to 
urgings by the Justice that this case, and that, and the other one should not be decided "now." 
249 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397 (:r951). 
25° United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951). 
25' Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 351 (1951). 
252 Missouri ex rei Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. I (1950). 
253 United States ex rel Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 470 (1951). 
254 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951). 
255 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951). 
256 The majority opinion in this group is in 341 U.S. 97 (1951), the dissent, ibid., at 87. 
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many of the uncertainties of the earlier Screws case,2s7 and his dissent in 
that group is as clear as it is hard-hitting. 
There are a few things with which to quibble. Why did the Justice, who 
has consistently opposed invalidation of state laws under the commerce 
clause, join in a dissent by Justice Frankfurter which is a most fulsome 
praise of the very decisions to which he has dissented?2 ss Why, in one case 
in which the continuance of one Reiss in the matter at the trial stage is 
extremely relevant, does the Douglas dissent say that Reiss was "dis-
missed from the case," while the majority opinion of Justice Reed says: 
"The request of respondent to dismiss Reiss after judgment was not acted 
upon by the trial court"?259 Which is right? But the details do not obscure 
the main line. A year which includes the opinions listed above is a very 
satisfactory year indeed. 
For charm and felicity of expression, Justice Jackson tops the bench. 
Some of his colleagues can get as much meat into a sentence, but none can 
garnish it as well. Examples: His dissent in the liquor tax-moral turpitude 
case (mentioned a few paragraphs above): "I have never discovered that 
disregard of the Nation's liquor taxes excluded a citizen from our best 
society and I see no reason why it should banish an alien from our 
worst."260 Or, concurring in a case which rejected an opinion on the im-
migration laws which, as Attorney General, Jackson had signed, and 
which he now regretted: "If there are other ways of gracefully and good-
naturedly surrendering former views to a better considered position, I in-
voke them all."261 Or, in decrying excess publicity about a criminal case: 
"The case presents one of the best examples of one of the worst menaces to 
American justice."262 Or, decrying the comparative results of the Joint 
Anti-Fascist case and Bailey v. Richardson in which, as he saw it, an or-
ganization was getting rights of due process but the individual govern-
ment employee was not: "So far as I recall, this is the :first time this Court 
has held rights of individuals subordinate and inferior to those of or-
257 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
2ss The conclusion is: "It is easy to mock or minimize the significance of 'free trade among 
the states,' ... which is the significance given to the Commerce Clause by a century and a 
half of adjudication in this Court. With all doubts as to what lessons history teaches, few 
seem clearer than the beneficial consequences which have flowed from this conception of the 
Commerce Clause." Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Michigan Public Service Co='n, 
341 U.S. 329, 340 (1951). Justice Douglas has disagreed with Justice Frankfurter on almost 
every one of the "adjudications of this Court" on that subject for the last eleven years. 
259 American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (Reed), 21 (Douglas) (1951). 
:16o Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 241 (1951). 
261 McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 178 (1950). 
262 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. so, 55 (1951). 
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ganized groups. I think that is an inverted view of the law-it is justice 
turned bottom-side up."•63 
In terms of results at least, Jackson's views were, with great frequency, 
the views of the Court. But this is limited to concurrence in result, for he 
frequently was in distinctive concurrence, rather than joining the main 
opinion. The best description of the relationship is that in I95D-5I, Justice 
Jackson and the balance of the majority were walking side by side. 
Justice Jackson this year took the most extreme anti-free speech views 
held by any Justice in at least two decades. His lone dissent in Kunz v. 
New Y ork,"64 though most ingenious, is a fundamental attack on the right 
to speak offensive dogmas, and, as has been more fully developed above, 
his lone position in the Dennis case would reduce the First Amendment to 
negligible scope except in those rare instances in which speech is solely the 
product of one man, unrelated to others. The clear and present danger test 
was first devised by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,"65 a con-
spiracy case, and more fully developed by Holmes and Brandeis in Abrams 
v. United States,"66 another conspiracy case. Justice Jackson in the Dem~is 
case seems to be saying that the test is inapplicable-in conspiracy cases. 
This, to borrow a phrase, is logic "turned bottom-side up." 
At the 1950 Term Justice Burton added a new and effective weapon to 
his armory, the succinct dissent. From every standpoint, the dissents are a 
success. His few paragraphs in Collins v. Hardyman•61 state his point and 
his reasons with great clarity, and his opinion in the Los Angeles Loyalty 
Oath case268 is the neatest of the five filed. One of the most admirable Bur-
ton opinions of prior years had been a lone dissent,•69 and while his general 
agreement with the Court's majority as presently constituted will pre-
clude his being a frequent dissenter, he may well do some of his best work 
when he is in lone position, freed of the necessity both of stating the whole 
case and of accomodating to the rest of the majority. 
The least graceful Burton opinion of the year is United States v. Yellow 
Cab Co.,"10 on the question of whether the United States may be impleaded 
as a third party defendant by a joint tort-feasor. The result, an affi.rma-
263 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 186 (1951). 
264 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951). 
265 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
266 250 U.S. 616 (1919). This thought is borrowed from my colleague, Professor Donnally, 
who is developing it in some detail in a forthcoming article in the Yale Law Journal. 
267 341 u.s. 651, 663 (1951). 
268 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 729 (1951). 
26~ Morgan v. Virginia, 328 u.s. 373, 389 (1946). 270 340 u.s. 543 (1951). 
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tive, seems correct and desirable. Note 4, at page 547, sets out the relevant 
statute to the extent of half a page. The text, on the very next page, sets 
out a large part of the same section over again-another half page. Some 
of the most impressive legislative history in support of the conclusion 
reached is buried in the middle of footnote 8, which covers a page and a 
third of the official reports and begins with a different and less interesting 
subject. Note ro, to the extent of a third of a page, sets out Rule 14 of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, although no point of interpretation of that rule 
is raised and its only relevance is its existence. On the other hand, the 
opinion very neatly dispatches the government quibble that, even though 
it can be sued for contribution, it may not be impleaded in an original case 
by a joint tort-feasor because of fancied difficulties arising from the mix-
ture of jury and non-jury issues in the same litigation. 
The four main Burton opinions of the year are, to my own taste, dis-
tinctly over-conceptual.•7• As we said above in discussion of the Spector 
Motor case/72 the opinion goes straight through substance to form. If, as 
all concede, the Taft-Hartley Act had to be rewritten in the secondary 
boycott cases, there was no reason to draw back at the very point where a 
little more rewriting would have made sense.m But the merits of con-
ceptual as against functional jurisprudence raise issues aside from the 
point here under discussion, for the relative weight to be given in law to 
words as against things is in constant dispute. For examples of a particular 
kind of jurisprudence, the Spector opinion and the Joint Anti-Fascist 
opinion are very fine. , 
No one can fairly complain that Justice Clark is overly conceptual. As 
was developed above, his several opinions on the commerce clause as a 
limitation of state power both ask the relevant questions and search in the 
facts for the relevant answers with a clarity which that difficult subject 
greatly needs.'74 No reader will have any difficulty in knowing exactly 
what circumstances in the actual life of the community making the regula-
tion and what balancing interest of the nation cause him either to uphold 
or to invalidate a law. On the merits, his focus on the presence or absence 
of actual discrimination in these cases strikes at the most vital point. 
m Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); NLRB v. 
Denver Building & Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951), and related cases; Spector Motor 
Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 6o2 (1951); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). 
m See p. I 82 supra. 
m NLRB v. Denver Building & Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). 
274 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil 
& Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950); Norton Co. v. Dep't Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 541 (1951), 
dissent; Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 6o2, 6xo (1951). 
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Disqualifi.cations in the leading free speech cases do not obscure the fact 
that as the new cases come up, Clark,will be standing squarely with Vin-
son and Reed. Where he could participate in such cases, he was with 
them.275 
The Champl.in case/76 with its remarkable conclusion that one definition 
clause in a statute means wholly different things for the purposes of dif-
ferent sections, is Clark's most eccentric bit of statutory interpretation for 
the year. His opinion in Emiclz Motor$211 is,unsatisfactory for the funda-
mental reason that it does not tell the reader what is decided. The suit was 
a treble damage action under the Clayton Act, and one issue was the 
weight to be given to a criminal verdict previously obtained against the 
same defendant. The Court of Appeals had reversed the trial court. The 
concluding sentence of the Supreme Court's misty opinion was: "The 
judgments below must therefore be reversed and the cause remanded to 
the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opin-
ion."278 But what was the District Court supposed to do? Should it now 
enter judgment for plaintiff, as it had originally? Should ,it give a new 
trial, based on the discussion in the Supreme Court opinion, and ignore 
what the Court of Appeals had said on other, distinct, points? Mystified 
counsel asked for a clarification, and the remand was then changed to a 
remand to the Court of Appeals, with instructions "to modify its judg-
ment to conform with this opinion."279 But if any reader of the reports 
wants to know the answer to the simple question-does or does not the 
Emich Company win its law suit?-he will not :find it in the Supreme 
Court reports even as modified. 
Good Clark opinions were Elder v. Brannan,280 a veterans' preference 
problem; the Cities Service Gas case28x (despite an over-leisurely statement 
of the facts); the Madison Milk case;282 and the Spect.or Motor Co. dis-
sent.283 
Justice Minton might deny that wisdom begins where research ends. 
27sFeiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) 
(Reed opinion, Chief Justice Vinson dissenting on a point unrelated to freedom of speech). 
276 United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341: U.S. 290 (1951). 
27'7 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951). 
278 The language is thus reported at'71 Sup. Ct. advance sheets 408, 416. It had been altered 
before the official reports appeared. 
279 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 945 (1951). 
28° 341 U.S. 277 (1951). 
28' Cities Service Gas Co. v: Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950). 
282 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 6o2, 6xo (1951). 
283 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 6o2, 6xo (1951). 
HeinOnline  -- 19 U. Chi. L. Rev.  229 1951-1952
I952] THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 195D-51 229 
He is captivated by the case in point. An illustration is Ackermann v. 
United States.•84 Ackermann was an immigrant about to be deported. He 
belatedly raised some defenses. Rule 6o(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
permits late defenses to be raised in cases of "(r) ... excusable neglect 
... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judg-
ment." The last immigrant, prior to Ackermann, to come to the Supreme 
Court with a belated defense was Klapprott, and his lateness was ex-
cused.•85 In facing Ackermann's case, Justice Minton turned to Klapprott. 
The process of distinction began. It was sound, workmanlike, thorough. 
Upon seeing it, no reader will doubt that Ackermann's case is not Klapp-
rott's case. That should raise the real question at hand: Does it matter 
that Ackermann's case is not Klapprott's case? Is it sound social policy to 
treat a deportation order with the rigidity of an ordinary civil judgment? 
If one exception should be made for Klapprott, should a new and different 
exception be made for Ackermann? But these are not questions for Justice 
Minton; Ackermann's case is not Klapprott's case, and therefore let 
Ackermann be deported. Q.E.D.•86 
The implied criticism goes to the jurisprudence, not to the skill in-
volved. Where close analysis is required, Minton's skill is very great. 
These opinions were particularly good: Fogarty v. United States,•81 on re-
lief to government contractors under the Lucas Act; Moore v. Chesapeake 
& Ohio Ry. Co./88 an FELA case, a model of tort law clarity; and Moser v. 
United States,•89 holding that a Swiss had not waived his rights to become 
an American citizen by applying for a military exemption, an opinion 
making neat dispatch of several points. His best opinion of the year is 
Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. United States,290 a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the factors which the Interstate Commerce Commission must 
consider in determining barge rates in relation to rail rates. 
284 340 U.S. r93 (r95o). 
28s Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 6or (r949). 
286 The two cases are contrasted in Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. r93, rgg-202 
(r95o), concluding: "From a comparison of the situations shown by the allegations of Klapp-
rott and Ackermann, it is readily apparent that the situations of the parties bore only the 
slightest resemblance to each other .... Neither the circumstances of petitioner nor his excuse 
for not appealing is so extraordinary as to bring him within Klapprott or Rule 6o(b)(6)." 
Justice Black, dissenting for Justices Frankfurter and Douglas concluded: "The re-
sult of the Court's illiberal construction of 6o(b) is that these foreign-born people dependent 
on our laws for their safety and protection, are denied the right to appeal to the very court 
that held (on the Government's admission) that the judgment against their co-defendant was 
unsupported by adequate evidence." Ibid., at 205. tl 
287 340 U.S. 8 (r95o). 289 34r U.S. 4r (r95r). 
288 340 U.S. 573 (r95r). 29• 340 U.S. 2r6 (r95r). 
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Last year the point was made that Justice Minton sometimes assumed 
the point in issue, so stating the question that the real matter in dispute 
was never resolved.29x That mannerism was not evident at all this year. In 
the Panhandle Eastern case the issue was whether Michigan could preclude 
an interstate natural gas seller from making all its sales to the cream of the 
local market, leaving only the less desirable business to a local utility. 
It is no surprise to learn that Michigan has this power, so far as the , 
Natural Gas Act and the Commerce Clause are concerned. Minton speaks 
of this as "regulation, not absolute prohibition," and Justice Frankfurter 
chides him with a statement that the "problem does not disappear by 
invoking a solving phrase."292 The point is not well taken, for Minton had 
fully considered the factors that made the Michigan control legitimate. 
But just as the great difficulties of a high-policy Court can not be met by 
a solving phrase, neither can they always be met by a solving precedent. 
CoNcLusroN 
In the months from October I950, to January I95I, war was the pre-
occupation of the American people. During that time they engaged in a 
small war, and prepared for a large one. In a narrow sense, the issue in 
both those wars-against a common enemy-is whether the giant of the 
Western Hemisphere or the titan of Eurasia shall rule the world. But this 
is indeed a narrow statement of the issue. In a larger sense, the issue is 
human freedom, the right of men to pray, to write, and to speak as they 
will. Both our power and our freedom have enemies foreign and domestic. 
In the year past, every American institution was called upon to lend what 
strength it could to the battle on every front. The Justices of1:he Supreme 
Court in this year faced almost exclusively the perils to freedom at home. 
Each one brought his best to the struggle-his knowledge of American 
traditions, his wisdom, his love of the Republic. Were these enough? Did 
we lose the skirmishes against the domestic enemies of freedom? Did we, 
striking in rage against our domestic enemies, wound ourselves? 
2 9' 1949 Term article, sx. 
292 Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329, 336 (Minton 
quotation), 339 (Frankfurter quotation) (1951). 
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The following list enumerates some of the certioraris denied, and appeals 
dismissed, including but not restricted to most of those cases in which some 
Justice dissented from the denial. The condensations are taken largely from 
Law Week. 
A word as to the appeals dismissed. Certiorari is a matter of the Supreme 
Court's discretion, while appeal is a matter of right to the party insofar as it 
is specifically authorized by Congress; cf. 62 Stat. 928 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1257 (1949). True, the Supreme Court may dismiss an appeal if it is "in-
substantial," Zucht v. King, 26o U.S. 174 (1922), and the test of insubstantiality 
is extremely subjective. If the Court treats truly arguable questions as "in-
substantial," or if it summarily affirms appeals, it has for all practical purposes 
obliterated the very difference between certioraris and appeals which Congress 
meant to preserve. The Courthasforsomeyears been in the process of interpret-
ing away the difference between appeals and certioraris, reducing the appeals 
also to a matter of its own discretion; and it seems probable that within a few 
years there will be little practical difference between the two methods of re-
view. Cases No. II4, 293, 488, and 504, listed below, illustrate this trend. 
The whole subject of certioraris denied is comprehensively reviewed in Har-
per and Etherington, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1950 
Term, to be published in a forthcoming number of the Pennsylvania Law Re-
view. One may disagree with their recommended solutions without disagreeing 
in any way with their conclusion that present experience raises grave doubts 
about the value of the Certiorari Act of 1925. 
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
(a) No. 69, Slzotkin v. Colorado, 212 P. 2d 1007 (Colo., 1949), Black and 
Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is scope of power to punish petitioner for con-
tempt for bringing a suit in violation of order of Colorado Supreme Court. 
(b) No. III, Taylor v. Birmingham, 253 Ala. 369, 45 So. 2d 53, 6o (1950), 
Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is whether Senator Taylor was denied 
equal protection and freedom of speech by conviction for disorderly conduct 
for entering church through door marked "Negro entrance." 
(c) No. 149, Ohio ex rel. Greisiger v. Bd. Education, 153 Ohio St. 474,92 N.E. 
2d 393 (1950). Issue is whether Jehovah's Witnesses may be barred from using 
a public school auditorium used by other denominations for religious purposes, 
the basis of exclusion being a ruling by the local school board that the Witnesses 
were not a "responsible organization." 
(d) No. 225, Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F. 2d 677 (App. D.C., 1950). Issue 
is whether fugitive from Georgia prison can raise by habeas corpus in District 
231 
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of Columbia, from which he is being extradited by Georgia, the allegation that 
he was being held interminably without trial and was subjected to cruel and 
inhuman treatment in Georgia. 
(e) No. 256,RD-DRCorp.v.Smith, 183 F. 2d 562 (C.A. 5th, 1950), Douglas, 
J. dissenting. The issue is whether the freedom of the press extends to movies, 
the Fifth Circuit holding that it did not and that therefore movies could be cen-
sored without limit on political grounds. (This, to me, is the most utterly incred-
ible denial of the year.] 
(f) No. 372,Shubv.Simpson, 75A. 2d842 (Md., 1950). This was no certiorari 
denied, but a refusal to expedite hearing. The Chief Justice and Black and 
Douglas, JJ., dissented. Since Shub's interest was as the Progressive Party's 
candidate for Governor of Maryland in the November, 1950, election, and the 
point to be decided was the validity of an oath required of him as a candidate, 
the case became moot upon the refusal to advance its hearing to October. 
(g) No. S74, Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., v. Felix, 186 F. 2d I (C.A. 
3d, 1950), Black, J., dissenting. Issue is liability of radio station for libel by 
candidate for public office using its facilities in view of the non-censorship pro-
visions of the Federal Communications Act. 
(h) No. 597, Goo v. United States, 187 F. 2d 62 (C.A. 9th, 1951), Black, J., 
dissenting. Issue is whether accused may withdraw plea of guilty before imposi-
tion of sentence. -
(i) No. 627, Lyon v. Zook (Cal., 1950, unrep.), appeal dismissed, Reed and 
Burton, JJ., dissenting. Issue is whether Jehovah's Witnesses were properly 
precluded from using school buildings. -
(j) No. 643, Pohl v. Acheson (App. D.C., 1951, unrep.), Black and Douglas, 
JJ., dissenting. The case involves a number of problems arising from petitions 
of habeas corpus by German prisoners of the American military establishment 
in Germany. 
(k) No. 713, Butler v. Thompson, 184 F. 2d 526 (C.A. 4th, 1950), appeal dis-
missed, Douglas, J., dissenting. Issue is whether the poll tax, as administered 
in Virginia, discriminates against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments, and violates the Act of 187o re-admitting Virginia to 
the Congress. 
In addition, the Court denied certiorari in No. 201, Sacher v. United States, 
182 E. 2d 416 (C.A. 2d, 1950), and No. 3oo, Hallinan v. United States, 182 F. 
2d 88o (C.A. 9th, 1950), Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting in both cases, in-
volving contempt by counsel in the New York Communist case and the Cali-
fornia Bridges case. 
The foregoing cases are taken from the Appellate Docket. Many of the cases 
of alleged denial of due process in criminal proceedings are on the Miscellaneous 
Docket.'Some of the denials in those cases in which dissents were noted were: 
No. 174,Dowdyv.Louisiana, 47 So. 2d 496 (La., 1950), Black and Douglas, JJ., 
dissenting; No. 303, James v. Washington, 221 P. 2d 482 (Wash., 1950), Black, 
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Reed, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting; No. 334, Pennsylvattia ex rel Johnson v. 
Dye (Pa., 1951, unrep.), Douglas, J., dissenting; No. 341, Marelia v. Burke, 
336 Pa. 124, 75 A. 2d 593 (1950), Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting; No. 997, 
Brownv.NorthCarolina, 233N.C. 202,63 S.E. 2d99 (1951),BlackandDouglas, 
JJ., dissenting. 
NON-CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
(a) No. 52, Prudence-Bonds Corp. v. Silbiger, 180 F. 2d 917 (C.A. 2d, 
1950), Douglas, J., dissenting. The Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that Sec-
tion 249 of Bankruptcy Act, which prohibits any "committee or attorney" from 
trading in securities of corporations in process of reorganization does not 
authorize disallowance of fees earned by attorneys whose clients traded in such 
securities. 
(b) No. 114, Hendricks v. Smith, 153 Ohio St. 500, 92 N.E. 2d 393 (1950), 
appeal dismissed, Douglas, J., dissenting. The issue is whether an Ohio property 
tax as applied to land leased in perpetuity from the University violates the con-
tract clause in view of an 1809 Ohio statute exempting university property from 
all taxes. 
(c) No. 131, FTC v. Alberty, 182 F. 2d 36 (App. D.C., 1950), FTC required 
drug seller of medicine for lassitude due to pernicious anemia resulting from 
iron deficiency to make clear that lassitude results less from iron deficiency than 
other causes. The Court of Appeals reversed as to this, holding that Com-
mission lacks power to compel advertiser to tell public that his product is 
more frequently valueless than it is valuable. 
(d) No. 164, Roberts v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 225 S.W. 2d 198 
(Tex. Civ. App., 1949), Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is whether 
FELA case evidence was sufficient to go to jury, in suit by baggage man in-
jured by sand kicked up by motion of train. 
(e) No. 232, Turner v. Alton Banking&> Trust Co., 181 F. 2d 899 (C.A. 8th, 
1950), Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Diversity suit in Missouri federal 
court on judgment obtained in Illinois state court. The judgment was secured 
on a cognovit note which authorizes any attorney to confess judgment against 
obligor. Obligor unsuccessfully contended in Missouri suit that lllinois judg-
ment, obtained with no notice, denies due process and is not entitled to full 
faith and credit. 
(f) No. 293, Wenning v. Peoples Bank, 153 Ohio St. 583, 9:2 N.E. 2d 689 
(1950), appeal dismissed, Black, Reed, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. A state 
mortgage foreclosure proceeding was filed a month before mortgagor filed 
farmed-debtor petition in federal district court under Section 75 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Thereafter the property was foreclosed by the state court. A variety 
of issues as to the validity of the state procedure in the light of Section 75 is 
raised. 
(g) No. 416, Commissioner v. Swiren, 183 F. :2d 656 (C.A. 7th, 1951), seeming 
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conflict of circuits on question of whether sale of interest in law partnership 
is a capital gain. 
(h) No. 427, Healy 11. Pennsylvania R. Co., I8I F. 2d 934 (C.A. 3d, 1950); 
184 F. 2d 209 (C.A. 3d, 1950), Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is 
whether in FELA case there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on question 
of proximate cause, the precise point involving the relation of the failure to blow 
a whistle and the death of the employee. 
(i) No. 451, 2, Koons v. Kaiser, Koons v. Kaufman, 187 F. 2d 1023 (C.A. 2d, 
1950), one of several cases which has raised the puzzling question of how and 
where, if at all, transfers of cases from one district to another under the new 
transfer provisions of the judicial code are to be reviewed. 
(j) No. 488, Kemp 11. South Dakota, 44 N.W. 2d 214 (S.D., 1950), appeal dis-
missed, Douglas, J., dissenting. The issue is whether a South Dakota statute 
precluding certain hunting licenses for nonresidents violates certain treaties 
and the privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV, Section 2. 
(k) No. 504, Rosecrans 11. West Edmond Salt Water Ass'n, 226 P. 2d 965 
(Okla., 1950), appeal dismissed, Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is 
whether order of state commission permitting injection of salt water into de-
fendant's well is a denial of due process as to plaintiff, under whose land the 
salt water will percolate, where the percolation will come into a stratum of land 
on which plaintiff already has salt water. 
(1) No. 528, M o.ffett 11. Arabian A mer. Oil Co., 184 F. 2d 859 (C.A. 2d, 1950), 
Black, J., dissenting. Plaintiff allegedly performed services under contract with 
defendant, whereby the United States government made certain requirements of 
British government which were of benefit to the defendant. The jury found that 
the plaintiff had, by his services, procured the desired result, but the District 
Court dismissed for want of evidence and on public policy. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed on the evidence point, and Black's dissent is probably on the 
question of the relative responsibilities of judge and jury on the question of 
fact. 
(m) No. 532, Ottleyv.St.Louis-SanF.Ry. Co., 232 S.W. 2d 966 (Mo., 1950), 
Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. This is an FELA case in which a jury verdict 
was set aside, and the issue is the extent of the power to set aside jury verdicts 
in these cases. 
(n) No. 561, Williamsv. Hughes Tool Co., 186 F. 2d 278 (C.A. IOth, 1950). 
The larger issue is whether plaintiff was using patents on rotary drilling bits, 
combined with a leasing system and a multiplicity of law suits, to prevent the 
sharpening of dulled tools and to restrain trade in resharpening. 
(o) No. 798, Dority v. New Mexico ex rel Bliss, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P. 2d 1007 
(1950), appeal dismissed, Reed and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is validity 
of New Mexico statute making subsurface waters public property, statute 
challenged on ground it denies due process and takes property without just 
compensation. 
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THE DOLLAR MIX-UP 
Seldom, if ever, has certiorari procedure looked worse as an instrument of 
justice than in Land v. Dollar. In 1945, the Dollar steamship interests brought 
suit in the District of Columbia against the Maritime Commissioners to re-
cover the stock of the Company. On the eventual outcome of the litigation 
depends the question of who owns this large line. The nature of the substantive 
dispute is immaterial here except to note that the matter is highly arguable. 
The Supreme Court, 330 U.S. 731 (1947) held that the suit was not against the 
United States but against the Commissioners in their individual capacities, and 
therefore did not infringe upon sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals in 
due course gave judgment on the substantive issues for the Dollars. At the 
1950 Term, in case No. 353, the Court denied certiorari, 340 U.S. 884, Black and 
Clark, JJ., not participating in this or the later stages of the matter. Later in 
the term the Court denied a petition for rehearing, 340 U.S. 948, and also 
denied certiorari in the related case No. 552. 
The normal grounds for granting certiorari are (a) public importance of the 
issue, or (b) conflict of decision. By its denial of certiorari, the Court necessarily 
implied either that the question of whether the government or the Dollars own 
the steamship company is not of importance, or that the legal issues involved 
were not of importance. The Government, veryproperly bewildered bythatsome-
what remarkable conclusion, thereupon set out to achieve a conflict. The earlier 
Supreme Court opinion cited above had held that the United States was not a 
party to the litigation, but that only the Commissioners were involved. The 
Government thereupon instituted a new suit in a federal District Court in Cali-
fornia in the name of the United States against the Dollars to preclude re-
linquishing the stock and thereby giving up the interests of the United States 
in that stock to the Dollars. The Government secured a temporary injunction 
in that California suit. This is the most absurd kind of legal fiction, since it 
assumes a difference between the interests of the United States and the Com-
missioners; but the certiorari system as thus administered requires this in-
genuity. 
Meanwhile the Court of Appeals was becoming outraged at the failure of the 
Commissioners to turn over the stock to the Dollars. With a great fanfare of 
publicity, it threatened the Secretary of Commerce, successor to the Maritime 
Commission, and other public officials with contempt. At the end of Term 
what had originally been merely case No. 353 was back with the Court again, 
on motion to reconsider the denial of the petition for rehearing of the original 
refusal to grant the writ. Along with it came Nos. 697 and 702, which were re-
spectively petitions to review an order requiring the Secretary of Commerce 
to endorse over the stock, and a temporary restraining order of the Court of 
Appeals enjoining the parties from proceeding in the suit instituted in California, 
and enjoining them from paying any attention to the California temporary 
injunction. 
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Chief Justice Vinson issued a stay, and finally, on the last day of the term, 
341 U.S. 912 (1951), the Court granted the petitions in Nos. 697 and 702, and 
continued the motion to reconsider the denial of No. 353 until the next term 
of Court. But this left the matter in chaos over the summer, and Justice Jack-
son, dissenting alone on this point, thought that the Court should stay in session 
to get the business settled once and for all. 
To sum up the consequences of the original denial of No. 353, because the 
Court felt that the ownership of this line did not raise questions worthy of being 
decided by it, the time of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and 
its District Court, and of the California federal District Court and, eventually, 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, are extensively occupied. The 
Secretary of Commerce, the Undersecretary of Commerce, the Solicitor General, 
the Deputy Attorney General, and a number of other federal officials have 
been brought into most unseemly conflict with the courts of the District of 
Columbia, and the newspapers have been filled with speculations as to whether 
those officers would go to jail fqr contempt. The time of countless attorneys, 
with great expense to all concerned and serious loss of efficiency for the govern-
ment agencies whose staffs have been involved in the litigation, has been ex-
tensively used, if not wasted. The "return" of the Government on the con-
tempt citation of the Court of Appeals, for example, is a document weighing 
over a pound. The question of title to the line is left in doubt for at least an 
additional year. 
And the Supreme Court will now have to deal with the situation anyway. 
Is it possible even to conceive of a reason why it would not have been better 
practice to have granted certiorari to No. 353 in the first place? 
